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The European Parliament
invites the European Commission to report to it on the state of the
negotiations between Great Britain and the six countries of the
Common Market on 29 January 1963. 
In this report the European Commission will set out both the
results already obtained and the problems still outstanding and
will give its opinion on the latter.
The report is to be submitted to the European Parliament within
three weeks and will be discussed by the Parliament at its March seSSIon. 
The report which follows has been prepared in response to this
invitation from the European Parliament.Contents
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1091.  OPENING OF THENEGOTIA TIONS 
A.  THE BRITISH APPLICATION AND THE ORGANIZATION
.oF THE CONFERENCE
After a series of bilateral consultations between the British Go-
vernment and the Governments of the member countries of the
'Community, the British Prime Minister , Mr. Macmillan, made a
statement to the House of Commons on 31 July 1961 in which he
:announced that Her Majesty s Government intended to open
negotiations with the European Economic CO111munity with a
-view to acceding to the Treaty of Rome under the terms of Ar-
11 de 237. 
In this statement the Prime Minister pointed out that no British
Government could joint the European Economic CO111munity
without prior negotiations on how the needs of the Commonwealth
'countries and of the members of the European Free Trade Asso-
dation could be met. The Prime Minister also drew attention to
the problems posed by British agriculture.
Following this statement, the British Government was, on
3 A ugust, authorized by the House of Commons to open nego-
tiations with a view to Great Britain s accession to the Commu-
nity; the terms of the motion conveying this authority were 
follows:
That this House supports the decision of Her Majesty s Govern-
ment to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of
Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrange-
ment~ can be made to meet the special interests of the United
Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade
Association; and further accepts the undertaking of Her Majesty
Government that no agreement affecting these special interests or
involving British sovereignty will be entered into until it has been
:approved by this House after full consultation with other Com-
monwealth countries, by whatever procedure they may generally
:agree.In the official application addressed by the British Government to
the President of the EEC Council on 9 August 1961, the British
Prime Minister repeated the main arguments of his statement to
the Commons.
As soon as the British Government's application was received
consultations took place in the Council of Ministers of the Com-
munity after which certain lines of action were laid down for the
negotiations:
1. The negotiations provided for under Article 237 of the
Treaty of Rome are negotiations between the six Community
States and Great Britain.
. As far as at all possible the six Community States will present a
joint point of view when dealing with Great Britain.
2. The Governments of the six Member States, wishing to have
the assistance of the Commission in the negotiations with Great
Britain, have agreed that the Commission should take part in the
Conference as adviser to the Six and would have the right to speak.
3. The Commission will share fully in the work of co-ordination
between the Six.
Speaking in the European Parliament on'S February 1963, the Pre~
sident of the Commission referred to the Commission s .reservations.
in regard to this procedure.
As to the principles to be observed in the negotiations, the Council
laid down:
1. That any application for accession to the Community would
mean that the country concerned unreservedly accepted the rules.
and objectives of the Treaty of Rome; consequently, negotiations.
for accession could only deal with the conditions of admission and
the adaptations of the Treaty which these would involve.
2. That for political and economic reaso~s a country s accession,
to EEC would involve its accession to ECSC and Euratom also.
3. That these principles should be made known to the countries.
applying for membership to EEC at the very first meeting.In the letter replying to the application to open negotiations with a
view to accession by Great Britain, the President of the Council
invited the United Kingdom Government to give the members of
the Community full information on the problems facing ~t
especially in the three spheres referred to in the application, and 
the solutions suggested.
The Commission of the European Economic Community, after
expressing its lively satisfaction with the statement made by
Mr. Macmillan, informed the Council, in reply to the request for
an opinion in accordance with Article 237 of the Treaty, that since
these negotiations would deal with a body of questions of interest
to the Community, it would e:s::press its opinion on these problems
as the negotiations progressed. It would thus be on the basis of
the results obtained that the Commission would give the opinion
required under Article 237 of the Treaty.
B.  THE BASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The proposals on procedure made by the Six were accepted by the
British Government, and at a preparatory meeting in Paris on
10 October 1961 Mr. Heath, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the
United Kingdom Delegation made a statement on the basis of
which the subsequent negotiations in Brussels took place.
In this statement the Lord Privy Seal recalled the reasons which
had led the British Government to make its application for the
opening of ' negotiations with a view to Great Britain s accession;
he laid particular stress on Great Britain s economic and historical
links with Europe.
The British Government declared its readiness to subscribe fully
to the various aims which the Governments of the member coun-
tries of the Community had set themselves. 
In particular, the British Government accepted without qualifica-
tion the objectives laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of
Rome, i~cluding the elimination of internal tariffs, a common
customs tariff, a common commercial policy and a common agri-cultural policy. The British Government was also ready to accept
and play its full part in the institutions established under Article 
and other articles of the Treaty.
The British Government considered that if the accession of a new
member called for adaptations it should be possible to deal with
these special probl~ms by means of protocols.
Mter thus accepting the principles of the Treaty, the Lord Privy
Seal referred to the problems which were to be covered in the
negotiations, in particular those already mentioned by Mr. Mac~
millan, and outlined the solutions he hoped to see accepted.
In addition to the major problems mentioned in its application, the
British Government reserved the right to disc~ss other subjects
arising from various articles of the Treaty, particularly in regard to-
the regulations, directives, decisions and recommendations adopted.
since the Treaty came into force.
The British Government suggested that the examination of som~
of these problems could wait until after the United Kingdom had
acceded to the Treaty, although for the more vital matters the
British Government considered that it was desirable to establish
mutual understanding before accession.
In taking official note of this statement, the Six expressed their-
pleasure at Mr. Heath' s acceptance of the general framework of the
Treaty and its aims. At the same time both the speaker for the~
Member States and the President of the Commission indicated the
limits within which the negotiations could take place, in particular:
We have been assured that the United Kingdom s accession will
apart from the necessary adaptations, not require any amendments
to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
and that it will be possible to settle by means of additional proto-.
cols the problems which will arise in connection with this acces-
sion. Nevertheless, we start from the principle that these proto-
cols must not be allowed to modify the tenor and the spirit of the
Treaty and must essentially concern transitional arrangements...
only.In fact, however grave and important the problems facing the
United Kingdom may be-and we willingly recognize that they are
in many cases grave and important-they need to be settled with-
.out exceptions becoming the rule and vice versa. Exceptions
made must not be of such scope and duration as to call into ques-
tion the' rules themselves or impair the possibilities of applying
these rules within the Community. The accession of new mem-
bers must take place in such a way that they may subsequently
share fully in the working out of common decisions in a Commu-
nity spirit.II.  THE NEGOTIATIONS
Introd uction
The statement made by Mr. Heath in Paris on  10  October 1961 in
response to a request from the Member States that the British
Government should inform them of the special problems with
which it was faced and of the solutions it contemplated was there..
fore taken as the basis of the negotiations. The fact that broadly
speaking the negotiations did not in the main centre on the articles
of the Treaty of Rome itself and that they did not follow the order
of the Treaty s provisions could not be considered surprising
SInce:
i)  The application was for accession under Article 237, and the
Treaty of Rome was therefore to be considered, in principle, as
accepted;
if)  In certain cases the particular problems raised by the United
l(jngdom Delegation differed rather widely from those the Six had
had to tackle when the Treaty of Rome was being negotiated, or
their incidence might be appreciably different.
In the sixteen months of the negotiations it. was therefore essen-
tially the major problems peculiar to Great Britain which. were
discussed, the aim being to find a solution which, while it took
British interests into account did not impair the spirit of their
Treaty or its practical working possibilities.
, Much the same approach has been adopted in this report: after 
chapter of questions connected with the level of the common
customs tariff, the first subject raised by Mr. Heath, subsequent
chapters will cover the further questions raised: Commonwealth
trade, United Kingdom agriculture and relations with EFT A, in
that order. It has been thought useful to devote separate chapters
to certain special proble~s such as the financial regulation, econo-
mic union and the legal, financial and institutional aspects of acces-
sion. Classification in this way also fits in fairly closely with the
different phases of negotiations. The level of the tariff and Com-monwealth matters were the first subjects discussed, and this took
till July last year; United Kingdom agriculture was dealt with
mainly from the autumn onwards. When the negotiations were
suspended, EFT A problems had not yet been discussed in detail
with the British, as in many cases contacts with the signatories of
the Stockholm Convention were still in an initial stage.
It is however quite obvious that there is something arbitrary about
classifying problems in this way. Though the classification is
based on. the requests put forward by the British, and though it
corresponds very closely with the course actually followed by the
negotiations, it cannot show fully all the complexity of the subject
and of the links between its various aspects. For example, prob-
lems connected with the Commonwealth may have a bearing on
the level of the common customs tariff or its application, just as
they can also be raised in certain cases in connection with arran-
gements for British agriculture itself, or again with the general
problem of association; the requests for zero -duties presented by
Great Britain are based in most cases on mixed interests affecting
Great Britain itself and certain Commonwealth countries and, in
some cases, certain EFT A countries; the interests of countries
such as India and Pakistan, at times considered as a separate prob-
lem, cropped up at other times in discussions on tropical pro-
ducts or processed foodstuffs.
For this reason several cross-references are given between one
chapter and another and any links between them have been brought
out.CHAPTER I
The level of the common customs tariff
A. THE GENERAL LEVEL  OF  THE COMMON CUSTOMS  TARIFF
In his statement of 10 October, the Leader of the United Kingdom
Delegation declared himself ready to accept the structure of the
present EEC tariff as the basis of the common tariff of the enlarged
Community. In these circumstances, he thought, the necessary
lowering of tariff levels might be achieved by making a linear cut
in the common tariff as it stood. He suggested that this might be
of the order of 20 %, a figure which the Community had considered
in another context.
However, the British "would wish to single out some items for
special treatment... our list will not be long
1. It should be stressed that by accepting the structure of the
common customs tariff the British Government adopted a general
standpoint which obviated what might have been a very delicate
legal and technical discussion.
The common customs tariff had been fixed by t~e Treaty of Rome
on the principle of the arithmetical average of the tariffs in the
member countries of the Community; If on this point Great
Britain had demanded a re-calculation of the whole of the common
customs tariff, considerable difficulties would certaiply have arisen.
These would have been further aggravated by the fact that other
countries had also applied for membership of the European Eco-
nomic Community. The United Kingdom Delegation s attitude
the only one in fact compatible with the reasonable limits of nego-
tiations for membership, was therefore to be welcomed; as the
Treaty sets no time":limit for such negotiations, any other principle
would have plunged the economies of the metp.ber countries into
permanent uncertainty and undermined one of the mainstays of
the Community.
2. The terms used by the United Kingdom Delegation did,
however, give rise to some uncertainty. . In the Communityview, the common customs tadffcould only mean the tariff 
established by the Council decisions of 13 February, 20 July and
29 December 1960, and by that of 2 March 1960 for products on
List G (annexed to the Treaty).
If it had been otherwise, the linear reduction of about 20 % pro-
posed by the British would have had to be applied to the common
customs tariff resulting from the negotiations under Art. XXIV (6)
of  GATT and consequendy wherever a reduction had been
accepted by the Community under the terms of this Article (there
were about 261 such reductions) the new rate would have worked
out in many cases at 40 % belo~ the common customs level as
est~blished by the decisions referred to above.
The opening talks with the United Kingdom Delegation made
it clear that in principle the United Kingdom accepted, for the
enlarged Community, thecomrnon customs tariff as modified by
the Dillon negotiations, subject to the Delegation s requests con-
cerning zero duties and the level of duties for agricultural and
tropical products (matters which are dealt with below). The
United Kingdom reserved, however, the right to request that at
the end of the negotiations the Six and the United Kingdom should
together examine whether the level of the tariff resulting from
those negotiations was appropriate as a tariff for the enlarged
Community or whether it still needed to be adjusted by comple-
mentary reductions which would not exceed the 20 % envisaged
for the negotiations. The British Government did not intend to
ask for any upward adjustments.
3. It would seem that the United Kingdom Delegation took the
view that an automatic 20 % cut would have been necessary if the
enlarged Community s customs tariff were to be made acceptable
to the GATT Contracting Parties. The Six were not able to fall
in with this argument: they considered that the present common
customs tariff was compatible with GATT and that, in view of the
higher general level of the British tariff, British membership would
not alter the situation. In particular, the incidence of the customs
tariff applied by Great Britain to countries outside the Common-
wealth and EFT A was heavier than that of the common customstariff; the Six therefore intimated that it was only on the basis of
adequate reciprocity that complementary reductions could be
made.
4. When the negotiations were suspended, the question of the
general level of the common customs tariff was, from this angle,
still unsolved. The United Kingdom Delegation had not stated
for which tariff items it reserved the right to examine jointly with
the Six a 20 % reduction or the possibility that complementary
adjustments not exceeding a 20 % cut should be made in the level
of the tariff after the end of the Dillon negotiations. The fact'
that it had still not been possible to reach agreement on certain
requests for zero duties may perhaps have helped to maintain
uncertainty on this point.
For its part, the Community was ready to consider the changes
within the limits contemplated by the United Kingdom Delega-
tion, provided always that the principle of reciprocity, which had
been one of the factors in the decisions of 12 May 1960 was
formally accepted by Great Britain.
5. It should be noted that those taking part in the Conferenc~
were aware of the existence of a further uncertainty which con-
cerned both the general level of and the individual rates in the
common customs tariff, an uncertainty which would last through-
out the negotiations under Article XXIV of GATT (particularly
paragraphs 5, 6 and 9) which would have had to be held once
Great Britain had joined the Community.
B.  BRITISH REQUESTS FOR ZERO DUTIES
IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
In paragraph 18 of the speech he made on 10 October 1961
Mr. Heath had said he would give a list of prqducts for which the
United Kingdom would not be able to accept the rates laid down
in the common customs tariff.
1. This list, which was presented by the United Kingdom Dele-
gation at the opening of the negotiations, contained 24 industrial12 '
products and groups of products. In April 1962 two other
products were added. For all these products the United Kingdom
Delegation requested a zero duty in the common customs tariff.
The British requests were in most cases based on the fact that 
large proportion of the United Kingdom s imports of the products
in .question come from Commonwealth countries and are therefore
admitted duty free or given preferential treatment under the
British customs tariff. , However, for certain products, the reason
for the British request was of an int~rnal econonric nature-namely
the danger of higher prices if the common customs tariff were
applied to imports of these items by the United Kingdom.
The list represented altogether about 16 % of United Kingdom
imports in the industrial sector. Some of the products affected are
of considerable economic importance (for example, wood pulp,
newsprint, aluminium, lead and zinc, and petroleum products).
2. The negotiations on these requests for ~ zero duties proved
difficult:
a)  Several of the items in question-often the more important
ones-were List G products, which had already given rise to dif-
ficult negotiations among the Six; agreement had been reached on
the duties for these items in the common customs tariff only as a
result of an extremely complex package deal worked out at the
Rome Conference of February and March 1960.
b)  Even for the products of lesser Importance, agreement was
seldom easy: each British request raised particular difficulties for
one or more Member States, and it was only with difficulty that a
way could be found of balancing out the various concessions to be
made by each party.
() Care had also to be taken to see that the solutions proposed dit
not lead to a permanent splitting up of the common mark~t in the
products in question, as this would have had unfortunate effects
on the free movement of goods between the Member States of the
enlarged Community. It was 'therefore important to avoid the
generalized use of any device which could have been introducedright away without difficulty but which would in the long run
have had serious consequences for the Community; such a formula,
which consisted of granting tariff quotas to the United Kingdom
only, was often put forward as a~way of getting round the problems
raised by the British requests.
3. In the 16 months of negotiations agreement was reached on ten
products only; with the exception of wood pulp, these were of
lesser individual importance and represented about 30 % of the
~olume of British imports covered by the list of 26 items:
a)  For two items (acetylene black, bars and rods of nickel-copper
alloy) a zero duty was agreed;
.b)  In two cases (sulphur and, in view of the possibilities offered
by Article 25 of the Treaty, cobalt oxide) the United Kingdom
Delegation withdrew its request;
c)  For six other items, a provisional solution was found in three
cases (wood pulp, ferro-silicon and ferro-chromium), it was
decided to apply List G protocols to the United Kingdom and to
review the problem in the light of the negotiations with the Scan-
. dinavian countries. In two other cases (silicon carbide and cal-
cium carbide) the Six agreed with the United Kingdom Delegation
to hold over examination of the question until Norwegian mem-
bership was being negotiated, and in the last case (rosin) until the
United Kingdom could, after its accession, take action to cut duties
under the association agreement with Greece.
Sixteen of the twenty-six items remained unsettled--four major
products and twelve "minor" products.
4. Of the four "major products , the Six reached a common
standpoint on  newsprint  only. The first proposal on this product
drafted on the basis of a Commission document, provided for:
a)  Recognition by the Six that after the accession of the United
I('ingdom the provisions of Articl~ 25 of the Treaty of Rome would
be applicable to British imports of newsprint, and would permit
the opening of a tariff quota on the same terms as those enjoyed
by other Member States; .b)  An assurance that .all the arrangements applying to newsprint
would be reviewed if the supply situation in the Community were
to change.
Neither this text not various alternative suggestions were accepta-
ble to the United Kingdom Delegation (which .maintained its
request for a guarantee of a zero duty for all British imports of
newsprint) .and the Six therefore, again on a proposal from the
Commission, endeavoured to accommodate the United Kingdom
difficulties by submitting to the sixteenth Ministerial Meeting the 
following formula:
1. From the date of the accession of the United Kingdom to the
EEC and up to the date of the third alignment of national duties
with the CCT, if the Commission finds that the production of
newsprint (heading 48.01 A of the CCT) in the Member States is
. not sufficient to supply the demands of any Member State, and
that such supply traditionally depends, to a considerable extent, on
imports from third countries, the Council, acting by means of a
qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, shall
grant to the Member State concerned tariff quotas at zero duty.
2. Such quotas may not exceed the limits beyond which ~he trans-
fer of activities to the detriment of other Member States becomes
apparent.
3. From the date of the third alignment of national duties with the
CCT the Council, acting by qualified majority vote on a proposal
of the Commission, may open a Community tariff quota at zero
duty equal to the sum of the tariff quotas which it would be possible
to grant under the criteria stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
present Agreement.
4. In the event of association of other major newsprint producets
with the Community, the whole of the system applicable to news-
print will be re-examined. The Member States declare their
readiness to extend to Canada the system which would then be
defined within the framework of association.
This document was submitted too late for the United Kingdom
Delegation to express an opinion on its content.With regard to the other major products (aluminium, lead and
zinc), discussions between the Six had not, when the Conference
was suspended, progressed sufficiently for a proposal to be sub-
mitted to the United Kingdom Delegation.
For aluminium, however, the possibility of granting the United
Kingdom a tariff quota, with duty fixed at 5 % was briefly discussed
with the United Kingdom Delegation. This discussion produced
no results; but at the sixteenth Ministerial Session the United
Kingdom Delegation intimated that it would no longer insist on a
zero duty for this product and would be willing to consider a
reduction of the existing duty. The last proposal submitted by the
Commission might constitute a fair compromise between the dif-
ferent interests involved; it provided ,
a)  That on the accession of the United Kingdom, the duty on
aluminium should be partially suspended at 7%;
b)  That this suspension should be temporary and should not
extend beyond the end of the Kennedy negotiations and at latest
beyond 1 July 1967, the date on which the "Trade Expansion Act
expIres;
c)  That during the period referred to in  b)  the Member States,
acting in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty and with due
regard to the speed-up decisions, should align their national
tariffs on this 7 % duty;
d)  That the application of Protocol XII relating to List G should
be suspended for the same period.
e)  That the duty on aluminium should be reduced to the rate
shown in  a)  and Protocol XII relating to List G be abolished if
satisfactory reciprocal concessions should be obtained in the tariff
negotiations conducted while the duty was partially suspended.
f)  That if there should be a reversion to the full rate of duty
Protocol XII relating to List G should once again be applicable to
the Benelux countries and to the Federal Republic of Germany, as
well as to the United Kingdom, it being understood that at the
moment of the last alignment of national duties on the common
customs tariff national tariff quotas would be converted into a
Community tariff quota with duty at 5 %.With regard to  lead and zinc discussions were particularly difficult
because of a crisis in the Community industries resulting from a fall
in world market prices. III view of this situation and of the
British interests involved, the Commission proposed that a solu-
tion be sought in the framework of a common industrial policy for
the sectors in question. This Commission proposal, in its final
form, ran as follows:
The Community declares its readiness to abolish the duties laid
down in the common customs tariff for lead and zinc provided the
other producer countries abandon the measures protecting their
industries.
Failing this, the Community will adopt the following system
which is designed to co~rect distortions of competition and of
supply resulting from the policies followed by certain countries
with a large output of the products in question:
1. More rapid implementation of the Treaty s objectives in respect
of Chapters 78 (lead) and 79 (zinc) of the common customs tariff
starting at the earliest date possible:
a)  abolition of internal duties
b)  application of the common customs tariff
c)  implementation of a common commercial policy.
2. Exemption from duty for lead bullion and the creation of a new
sub-heading (78.01 A I) in the common customs tariff for this
product.
3. Continued isolation of the Italian metal and scrap market for
the period laid down in paragraph 2 of Protocol XV relating to
List G and retention of similar measures for semi-finished goods
, as long as the conditions referred to in Article 226 persist; the
suppression of these protective measures should be gradual.
4. Suspension of the common customs tariff duties for headings
78.01 A II (unwrought lead, others) and 79.01 A (unwrought zinc)
under the conditions defined in paragraph 5 below, if the London
Metal Exchange prices reach a sufficient level.At the present stage, a price level of f.75 per long ton for lead
and !85 per long ton for zinc is considered sufficient.
The duties to be re-imposed, under the conditions defined in
paragraph 5 below, if The London Metal Exchange prices fall
below the price level referred to above.
5. Both the suspension and the re-introduction of the coinmon
,customs tariff would be carried out on the seventh day after the
Commission had noted that the London Metal Exchange rates had
r~ched or fallen below the price limits shown in paragraph 4
:above for twenty consecutive trading days.
The fact that the Commission has noted that the said conditions
are fulfilled shall be notified to the Member States.
6. The price levels shown in paragtaph 4 above could be revised
under the provisions of Article 28 of the Treaty.
7. The right to invoke the provisions of paragraph 1 of Proto-
,col XV relating to List G shall be abrogated.
8. The United Kingdom shall effect the alignment of 'its prefer-
ential tariff with the common customs tariff rates in the following'
stages:
a)  first alignment : upon acceSSIon
.b)  second alignment: 1 J ul Y 1964
c)  third alignment : 1 January 1967.
This solution would have gone a long way towards satisfying the
United Kingdom Delegation (zero duty for lead bullion, which
accounts for about 27 % of British lead imports, decalage (1) of
the second alignment of the preferential duties with the common
customs tariff and abolition of the enlarged Community s tariff
protection if the price level reverted to normal) and at the same
time would have ensured the working of the common market in the
metals sector.
(1) Le. postponement. See page 33 et seq.The Commission still considers that this proposal, like those put
forward for newsprint and aluminium, could have provided the:
basis for a compromise.
At the sixteenth Ministerial Meeting the United Kingdom Dele~
gation stated that they were prepared to limit the request for a
zero duty to certain qualities of lead and zinc (lead bullion and
super-refined zinc) provided tariff quotas could be granted to the:
United Kingdom for the other types of lead and zinc.
5. Most of the remaining manufactures in the list of 26 items,.
could normally be considered as "minor ; during the sixteenth
Ministerial Meeting the United Kingdom Delegation stated that
these were hardly likely to produce serious problems once the
question of more important items had been settled.
As regards these ":minor" items it does not seem likely that better
results would have been obtained if they had been dealt with pro-
duct by product. In the endeavour to reach a final solution one
of two courses might have been adopted: there could have been
partial and linear suspension of duties pending the outcome of the
Kennedy round" or, alternatively, there could have been greater
flexibility in the progressive introduction of the common customs
tariff, combined if necessary with other measures under Article 2S
of the Treaty.
Some of these ":minor" products concerned were in British re-
quests of particular interest to India and Pakistan (heavy jute goods
East India kips, hand-knotted carpets, coir mats and matting).
In view of the very specific interest of these products; they will be
examined in the next chapter, dealing with the settlement of prob-
lems of interest to the countries concerned.
Moreover, during the negotiations, the United Kingdom Delega-
tion had submitted other requests for changes in the rates laid
down in the common customs tariff. These were:
a)  10 manufactured products of interest to India, Pakistan and
Ceylon;b)  25 tropical products;
c)  17 processed foodstuffs.
In view of the specific aspect of these questions, they will be dealt
with later in chapters dealing more particularly with the prpblems
of interest to each of the main categories of Commonwealth
--countries.CHAPTER II
Commonwealth problems
INTRODUCTION
GROUPING  OF  COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
1. Mr. H~ath's statement of 10 October 1961 referred to the links:
between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and to their importance for Great Britain. "Commonwealth trade is one
of the strongest elements in maintaining the Commonwealth asso-
ciation. It would be a tragedy if our entry into the Community forced other members of the Commonwealth to change their whole
pattern of trade and consequently perhaps their political orienta-
tion . Mr. Heath also pointed out that the economies of most
Commonwealth countries had been built up on the basis of supply-
ing the British market (1), which has traditionally imported their produce duty-free and often on preferential terms. 
Mr. Heath's statement went on to say that the British Government
considered that Cornmonwealth problems
' could be solved either
through the Treaty itself, or by protocols annexed to it, by analogy with the solutions which had been adopted for settling relations between the Community and those countries with which one of
the Member States had special links.
Two types of solution were quoted in this connection:
i)  One, employing the precedent of the protocol 
annexed to the' Treaty, and applicable mainly to Morocco and Tunisia
, allowed the countries concerned to maintain unimpaired their right 
of access to the market of the country with which they 
had special links.
ii)  The second Was concerned with those overseas countries and territories for which the Community 
as a whole has made a special
arrangement.
2. It was difficult to accept a priori an 
analogy of such general
scope. Indeed, the Cornmonwealth is a bloc of much greater economic importance than the 
precedents quoted on the British
(1) Commonwealth imports represent more than 35 % of the 
United Kingdom s total imports-side; its legal structure is quite different; and in addition it is
extremely heterogeneous as regards both production and level of
development. It \Vas therefore only after much more thorough
and specific study of the problem that a search could be made for
some method by which the relationship between the Common-
wealth countries and the United Kingdom market could gradually
be adapted to conform with the situation created by Great Britain'
acceptance of the rules contained in the Treaty of Rome. Indeed
in his statement the Lord Privy Seal had already suggested that the
various problems involved in this situation could be split up into
their different components. In particular, he made a distinction
between the problems relating to manufactures, to raw materials
d commodities, to temperate foodstuffs and to tropical products.
The complexity of the problems was nevertheless such that there
were difficulties in getting the negotiations started in a practical
and satisfactory, way. It seemed particularly difficult to choose
between an "individual country or global" approach, and an
individual product" approach.
3. The Commission then proposed a grouping of the Common-
wealth countries, generally known as the "Deniau classification
on the basis of the essential characteristics of their export trade
and the type of problem raised in relation to the provisions of the
Treaty of Rome.
This classification contained the following categories:
i)  Canada, Australia and New Zealand with their exports of manu-
factured products; these had already been treated in Mr. Heath'
statement as being in a category of their own;
ii)  Countries whose essential problems were linked principally
. with the application of the common customs tariff and the common
commercial policy;
Iii)  Countries whose exports were largely affected by the Associa-
tion established under Part IV of the Treaty;
it)  Countries whose problems were mainly agricultural but might
also be affected to a greater or lesser degree by the existing Associa-
tion;v)  Others:
a) Bases and transit ports;
b) European countries with a Mediterranean type production;
c) Countries which present a special problem in connection with
the export of petroleum products;
d) Countries coming under various categories.
vi)  Countries whose exports did not seem to raIse any special
problems.
Discussions were started on the basis of this classification after
it had been adopted by the Conference; this enabled various types
of agreement. to be reached. Each of these categories will be
examined in detail below.
A.  CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
1. Manufactures
In paragraph 39 of the statement he made on 10 October 1961
Mr. Heath, explaining the United Kingdom Delegation s position
on imports of manufactures from the developed countries of the
Commonwealth, had expressed anxiety lest the loss of the existing
preference for these products on the British market coupled with
the establishment of reverse preferences in favour of the major
industrial countries in Europe might seriously harm the Common-
wealth countries concerned. However, Mr. Heath had recognized
that indcfi~ite and unlimited continuation of free entry over the
whole of this field might not be regarded as compatible with the
development of the common market.
a)  First, an economic and statistical survey of the pattern of trade
was established. On this occasion, the United Kingdom Delega-
tion stressed the point that imports of manufactures from Canada
Australia and New Zealand would represent in fact only a tiny
fraction of the enlarged Community s imports and that for this
reason a protocol such as is provided for in the Treaty of Rome
to accommodate trade between the two parts of Germany, could
be considered an appropriate solution.This view was not acceptable to the Six. The continuation of
duty-free entry to the United Kingdom markets of a very varied
range of industrial products, representing some 11 % of all non-
agricultural imports into the United Kingdom (1), for an indefinite
period would, in their opinion, have raised insoluble problems from
the angle of the competitive position of Great Britain s processing
industries on the one hand and the free movement of goods
(deflections of trade) on the other.
.b)  However, in order to cushion the effect that any too rapid
change in the preferential situation on the British market might
have on these three countries' export industries, the Commission
proposed a device-known as the " decalage -which would slow
down the tempo of alignment, as compared with the normal tempo
of the preferential British duties for the exports in question on the
common customs tariff.
This solution required that a first alignment of the preferential
British tariff should be carried out in any case on Great Britain
accession to the EEC, in order to make the gradual and progressive
nature of the device chosen quite clear, and it also required that
the United Kingdom should apply the common customs tariff
in full not later than at the end of the transiti9nal period provided
for in the Treaty (1 January 1970). The adjustment of the inter-
mediate dates so as to slow down alignment had not only the
advantage of avoiding any unduly sudden t3:riff changes and 
making it easier, in terms of time, for the Commonwealth countries
to adapt themselves, but also the very important advantage of
allowing possible tariff cuts under the tariff negotiations sponsored
by the President of the United States to be taken into account in
this alignment.
After several discussions on this subject, the delegations of the
Six and the British Delegation .accepted the Coinmission s sugges-
tion and adopted on 25 May 1962 a Conf~rence agreement on the
problem in question.
(1) In 1961The provisions of the agreement included a stipulation that, for
those industrial products from Canada, Australia and New Zealand
in regard to which a special request had been submitted, the United
Kingdom would align its preferential tariff on the common
customs tariff according to the following time-table:
First alignment of 30  10  on accession;
Second alignment of 30 % on 1 January 1967;
Final alignment on 1 January 1970.
In addition, the Conference recalled the Council's statement of
5 and 6 February 1962 concerning the views of the Community
on multilateral negotiations aimed at reducing, on a reciprocal
basis, customs duties on industrial products.
Lastly, the Community declared itself willing to examine, in 1966
and 1969, in consultation with Canada, Australia and New Zealand
the development of its trade with these countries and to take the
appropriate measures in the light of all the circumstances and in
conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.
2. Processed foodstuffs
In his speech of 10 October 1961 Mr. Heath had also referred to
the problem, in the same context, of processed foodstuffs, pointing
to the difficulties which would stem from the abolition of existing
preferences on the British market and the simultaneous application
of a system of preferences which worked in favour of the countries
of the enlarged Community and to the disadvantage of the Com-
monwealth.
Moreover, the United Kingdom is generally a heavy consumer but
only a minor producer of these products, and depends traditionally
on imports for its supplies. The introduction of a duty on these
imports would force consumer prices up. Mr. Heath had, how-
ever, accepted the principle that the indehnitecontinuation of free
entry for these products on the Uniteg Kingdom market was
incompatible with the development of the Common Market.Six made it clear. that they were aware of the political and
omic importance of these products for the Commonwealth
~rting countries. It should, however, be noted that in certain
these same products also had great economic and political
rtance for Community producers. The Six also drew the
:cion of the United Kingdom Delegation to the tariff nego-
()qs which are to take place with non-member countries, and
the fact that these various tariff items may as a result soon come
kip for discussion in another context.
a)  The United Kingdom Delegation submitted a series of proposals
covering some eighty products. At the outset the United King-
dom Delegation asked that there should be a Zero tariff for about
ten products and for the others, tariff reductions, duty-free quotas
, or quotas at preferential duty rates.
In October 1962 an agreement was reached at Deputies' level
between the Six and the United Kingdom Delegation on about
forty products. By analogy with the treatment accorded to the
,l'roblems previously raised, this agreement provided for a "stand-
ard" decalage and an examination in 1966 and 1969 by the enlarged
Community in consultation with Canada, Adstralia and New
Zealand, of the way trade with these countries had been developing.
In the subsequent discussions the Ministers of the Six made a
;general proposal with regard to all the products for which no
lution had yet been found. They proposed a "soft , i.e. more
dual, decalage, involving a further deceleration of the initial
p~ for alignment on the common customs tariff (1) ; moreover
otal suspension of duties in the common customs tariff was
ted for three products. This general proposal was made
~tional on the British Government accepting the whole as
ckage deal.At the meeting of 16 January Mr. Heath declared himself willing
to consider the Six's proposal if it were pos~ible to take up his
own proposals for canned fruit (peaches, pears and pineapples
which are of the greatest importance for Australia), and canned
salmon (whiCh is of great importance to Canada). On dried grapes
Mr.. Heath had asked to be kept informed of the problems raised
by the Agreement of Association with Greece.
Mr. Heath maintained his request for a zero duty for canned
salmon because of the importance of this item for Canada and
Great Britain and also because he did not think that Community
interests precluded such an arrangement.
b)  It is therefore clear that, apart from the need to find a solution
for these three products, there were prospects of reaching a broad
agreement on the British requests concerning processed foodstuffs
from the Commonwe~lth countries; the agreement would depend
on use of the decalage system.
These three products referred to above involve fairly important
special interests on the part of either the British consumer or of
Commonwealth producers; however, it should have been quite
possible for the United Kingdom, once inside the Common Market
to .accommodate these interests by using the existing machinery
of the Treaty of Rome. In the case of dried grapes, the limits set
by the Athens Agreement would have had to be taken into account.
B.  INDIA PAKIST AN, CEYLON, HONG KONG
When speaking of the overall solutions applicable to Common-
wealth problems in his opening statement of 10 October 1961
Mr. Heath did not formally group together the three big countries
.of South-East Asia and the colony of Hong Kong; this grouping
emerged in the classification referred to above. The solutions
initially put forward by the Lord Privy Seal as part of his two-
pronged approach to Commonwealth problems-by region and
by commodity-may be summed up as follows:
a)  For Hong; Kong..  in principle association with the Community
under Part IV of the Treaty, as a Crown Colony;b)  For India, Pakistan and Ceylon..  an offer of association but with
the possibility of redefining the association of overseas countries
in the light of objections which the three Commonwealth coun-
tries had raised to the terms of the Convention as annexed to the
Treaty of Rome, since they consider.ed these difficult to accept.
As to the alternative of a regional solution modelled on the Tunisia-
Morocco Protocol, it would seem that it may at the time have
been looked upon as a possibility for Hong Kong, but not seriously
in the case of India and Pakistan.
The positions adopted by Mr. Heath when discussing the problem
from .the regional angle were from the outset considerably qualified
by some of the' arguments he used in the product-by-product
approach. For further information on the initial British proposals
concerning tropical products and certain commodities which play
an important part in the economy of the three independent coun-
tries considered, the chapters of this report deal).ng with these
products should be consulted. The positions which the Lord
Privy Seal adopted at the time on manufactured products from the
developing countries of the Commonwealth call for special
comment. In his statement of 10 October 1961, Mr. Heath had
pointed out that developed countries had  a duty "to facilitate
international trade in this field as much as they can . He therefore
requested the Six to "agree that it would not be in the general
interest that the United Kingdom should erect fresh tariff barriers
to cut back such trade This was a cautious formulation which
could be reconciled with the preceding more general statement to
the effect that the British Government agreed
' "
that indefinite .and
unlimited continuation of free entry over the whole of this field
may. not be regarded as compatible with the development of the
common market
1. The general problem
It is quite clear that any unqualified insistence by the British 
regional solutions modelled strictly on the precedents of the Treaty
of Rome (association under Part IV, Tunisia-Morocco Protocol)would inevitably have met with opposition from the Six., Even
leaving aside the difficulties from the angle of political and geo-
graphical homogeneity, the economies of India, Pakistan, Hong
Kong and, to a lesser degree, Ceylon have special features which
could suffice to make their incorporation into the complex of
associated countries and territories an extremely delicate matter;
one such feature is the existence of a manufacturing industry,
already powerful in certain sectors and enjoyip.g particularly
favourable wages conditions, which would have made association
under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome difficult. The same consid-
erations, coupled with the ability of the three independent
countries to export tropical products, made the Tunisia-Morocco
Protocol solution inacceptable to the Six. Such a solution would
on the one hand have involved grave threats of deflection of trade
for the Community and on the other would have stripped associa-
tion under Part N of some of the advantages it offered to tropical
producers.
The negotiations thus avoided the impasse of the existing regional
solutions which were not appropriate for the countries in question
and moved in the direction of a quite original type of solution not
foreseen at the beginning. Leaving aside divergences of detail
by country, the gist of the agreements or draft agreements worked
out can be summarized as follows:
a)  The common customs tariff would in 1970 be fully applied
to British imports from the countries concerned, but there would
be a decalage in its introduction and the duties on certain products
could be reduced, suspended or abolished.
b)  A common policy should be settled, and this might go further
than purely trade matters in order to maintain and even develop
in reasonable fashion the growth potential of the countries con-
cerned while at the same time it would offer the guarantees needed
to safeguard Community interests.
At one and the same time this approach would have respected the
tariff provisions of the Treaty of Rome and would have, fore-
shadowed the liberal common commercial policy provided forin the Treaty and confirmed by the Community. It was worked
out by the Commission s delegation, in an endeavour to reconcile
the various existing situations in a spirit consonant both with the
Treaty and with certain recent developments in world trade
relations (GATT agreement on cotton goods, bilateral agreements
with Japan, etc.). The agreements and draft agreements existing
when the negotiations were interrupted may be analyse~ as follows:
2. India, Pakistan
Introduction of the .common customs tariff
a)  For manufactured products' and processed foodstuffs the com-
mon customs tariff would not have been introduced in full by the
United Kingdom before 1 January 1970, except for the duties on
jute and cotton textile products; here the final date for introduction
of the common customs tariff would have been that resulting from
the acceleration decisions, probably 1 January 1967. The timing
of the alignment with the common customs tariff would have been
15 % on accession, 15 % on 1 July 1965, 20 % on 1 January 1967
(i.e. at this date a duty generally equal to 50 % of the duty under
the common customs tariff), 20 % on 1 July 1968 and the remaining
30 % on 1 January 1970. This so-called "soft" decalage was
adopted to make allowances for the vulnerability of the external
trade of the two countries and the relative weakness of their
competitive potential in the industrial field now and in the imme-
diate future. Cotton goods and jute goods would not have
benefited from the soft decalage precisely because exports from
India and Pakistan in this field were considered likely to 
immediate injury to the Community industries. For cotton goods
provision was, nevertheless, made for a certain decalage, with due
allowance for, the special safeguard measures agreed upon: align..
ment with the common customs tariff was planned in four stages,
of 20 %, 20 %, 30 % and 30 % respectively" No decalage was
provided for in respect of jute goods but it should be noted that
exports from India and Pakistan would to some extent have
benefited from the facility accorded to the United Kingdom
within certain limits, of retaining until 1 January 1970 quantitativerestrictions with respect to most of the products from the Six
so far barred from the British market by the Jute Control Office.
.b)  As regards the tropical agricultural products of the two
countries, decalage in the introduction of the common customs
tariff had been formally agreed only for vegetable oils and pepper.
It seems in fact that when the negotiations were suspended
generalized application of the "soft" decalage to tropical products
was in sight. This would have benefited India and Pakistan.
c)  The following tariff measures had also been accepted by the Six
to reduce the disadvantages that would arise for India and Pakistan
when the United Kingdom applied the common customs tariff:
i) Zero duties on tea, lemon-grass oil, decolourized or bleached
shellac, and handloom products (subject to certain technical
customs arrangements). At British request the Community had
further accepted a zero duty for two products of interest to these
~ountries (polo sticks and cricket bats);
ii) Suspension of duties, indefinite or otherwise, in respect of
a number of spices, essential oils and other tropical products of
particular interest to exporters in the two countries, and of castor
oil and desiccated coconut, products for which the British side
also asked that the tariff be modified (see Chapter II, C);
ill) In response to British requests, the Six had made proposals
concerning some manufactures of particUlar interest to India and
Pakistan (heavy jute goods, East India kips, hand-knotted carpets
colt mats and matting). For these the Community declared its
readiness to apply a partial suspension of duties under the common
customs tariff of the order of 10 to 15 % of the listed duty, the sus-
pension to be maintained either until the signature of trade agree-
ments with India and Pakistan or until the end of the Kennedy
negotiations. In making this gesture the ,Six wished to show that
they we're prepared to negotiate on the customs duties for these
products when negotiations were started for a comprehensive
trade agreement with the countries in question; these were to begin
not later than three months after Great Britain's accession.The United Kingdom Delegation did not consider this offer
adequate. In January 1963 it abandoned its initial position on
three of the products in question (hand-knotted carpets, coir mats
and matting, heavy jute goods) and asked for a reduction of
the duties instead of a zero duty in the common customs tariff.
The reductions proposed, however, went much further than those
contemplated by the Six. For another product (East India kips),
the United Kingdom Delegation maintained its request for a zero
duty.
d)  The Six had not yet made any proposals on the problem of
Indian tobaccos, as the Conference had not yet taken up the general
problem of tobacco.
CommotZ polity
As soon as the United Kingdom became a member, the enlarged
Community would declare its readiness to start negotiating with
India and Pakistan on comprehensive trade agreements which
should be ready by the end of 1966 at the latest. The aim of these
agreements would be to develop mutual trade "for the purpose of
maintaining -and, as much as possiBle, increasing the level of the
foreign currency receipts of these countries, and in general of
facilitating the implementation of their development plans . The
means to be employed could concern in particular tariff policy,
quota policy, export policy (guarantees to avoid disturbing the
markets of importing countries), the encouragement of private
investment, and technical assistance. The agreements could be
concluded for a number of years and would be renewable; in
connection with their implementation there would be the usual
arrangements for consultation.
The Indian Government had expressed its agreement in principle
with the idea of a ~omprehensive trade agreement envisaged by the
negotiators. It had, nevertheless, indicated in this connection its
desire that the United Kingdom should delay any introduction of
the common customs tariff with respect to Indian exports until the
agreement had been concluded or that, at least, the duties appliedshould be no more than symbolic. This request in its general form
was, not favourably received by the Six.
The basic principles adopted for these trade agreements therefore
defined only the main lines to be followed by the common policy,
in particular the commercial policy, which the enlarged Community
would pursue in, its dealings with India and Pakistan. More
specific arrangements were, however, agreed for cotton.
Cotton goods
A system of mutual guarantees had been envisaged by the negotia~
tors for exports of cotton goods from India and Pakistan. The
aims of this system were, on the one hand, to ensure that the
introduction, even with decalage, of the common customs tariff
should not harm these exports, which it should be possible to
continue at a certain level, and, on the other, to afford special
guarantees to the Community s cotton industries against disrup-
tion of the market caused by initial divergences between the trade
and tariff policies of the Six and of the United Kingdom.
a)  In order to make allowance from the outset for any possible
compensations within the Community in favour ' of India and
Pakistan, the point at which the guarantees offered to the exporting
countries would begin to operate would be calculated on the final
imports for retention of the whole enlarged Community and not of
the United Kingdom alone. The concept of a drop in exports
from India and Pakistan was defined by taking into account not
only the level reached by these exports in the years immediately
preceding the United Kingdom s accession but also the increases
in this level which could be expected to result from the application
of the GATT arrangement to imports of cotton textiles from deve-
loping countries (Geneva Agreement). Should the Commission
note any such drop, it would make proposals 'to the Council
which would take a decision, - in accordance with the provisions
of the Treaty, to remedy the situation; failing this, the Commission
could authorize the United Kingdom to postpone or suspend the
implementation of the common customs tariff or to establish anappropriate tariff quota. These arrangements were to be valid
until 1 January 1967, after which they would in principle be re-
placed by the trade agreements.
b)  In return the United Kingdom would endeavour to obtain the
maintainance, at approximately the present levels, of its voluntary
agreements with India and Pakistan limiting the exports of cotton
goods; failing this, it undertook to put into operation the GATT
safeguard clause on cotton goods.
The Commission was also instructed to follow the development
of intra-Community trade in cotton textiles. If it found that
British exports of cotton goods and plain made-up goods were
expanding at an abnormal rate and were creating or threatening to
'Create difficulties as a result of the supply of grey cloth from India
and Pakistan to the British industry, the Commission was to invite
the British Government to make the issue of a certificate of cir-
culation for textile products processed in the United Kingdom
and exported to other Member States subject to the payment 
the full duty under the common customs tariff on semi-finished
cloth imported from India and Pakistan and used in the said
products. Should this arrangement prove ineffective.' the Com-
mission would as a matter of urgency authorize the Member State
or States concerned to take appropriate measures in agreement
with it.
These guarantees were to be maintained until such time as the
common commercial policy was applied to trade with the coun-
tries concerned.
It was in the framework of such a commercial policy that the
various problems were to have been solved.
3. Ceylon
Ceylon was of course to have benefited widely from most of the
measures for tariff reduction and decalage envisaged in the nego-
tiations, in particular those affecting certain tropical products.
The adoption in the common customs tariff of a zero duty on tea
would represent a substantial advantage for this country.Furthermore, the principle of a declaration had been agreed.
In this declaration the enlarged Community would express its
readiness to conclude with Ceylon a comprehensive trade agree-
ment of the type envisaged for India and Pakistan if the Govern-
ment of Ceylon considered this advisable.
4. Hong Kong
When the negotiations were interrupted only the United Kingdom
Delegation had officially submitted a relatively precise proposal;
the Six had not yet drawn up definitive proposals in detail.
The most recent British position can be summed up as follows:
the common customs tariff would have been applied by the United
Kingdom to its imports from Hong Kong with the same time-
limits and decalage as for similar goods from India and Pakistan.
The future commercial policy of the enlarged Community towards
Hong Kong was to have allowed, among other factors, for the
British Government's responsibilities in respect of Hong Kong
as a dependent territory and the need to improve, if possible, the
living standards of the population. With this in mind provision
would have been made for periodical consultations between the
enlarged Community and the Government of Hong Kong to
review the development of trade between the Community and the
Territory. If any special problems had arisen it would have been
for the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, tp-
take all appropriate measures in conformity with the Treaty of
Rome and with the principles of commercial policy defined above.
Reciprocal guarantees, similar to those decided on for exports
from India and Pakistan, would have been given forthwith in
respect of exports of cotton goods from Hong Kong.
The Commission is firmly of the opinion that the problem of
relations with Hong Kong could in the long run have been solved
only in the framework of the Community s common commercial
policy. In preparation for this policy, however, it would have
been possible to envisage two arrangements immediately on British
acceSSlon:a)  Consultations
These would have taken place periodically on the basis of a report
prepared by the Commission. Their aim would have been the
progressive liberalization of trade with Hong Kong and the
examination of the impact on this territory of the gradual implemen-
tation of the common customs tariff. If the Commission should
find that Hong Kong s interests were being threatened as a result
of the implementation of the common customs tariff, the Com-
munity would take action under its commercial policy or, failing
this, would authorize safeguard measures to be taken on the British
market for the benefit of Hong K~ong.
It should be noted that any progress made in liberalizing trade
would depend largely on the system of control of origin applied
in Hong Kong and, in certain cases, on the conclusion of volun-
tary agreements to limit exports.
b)  Safeguard measures in the event of disturbances in the Community
market
Since Hong Kong s exports are more diverse than those of India
and Pakistan, it would have been appropriate to arrange that these
safeguards should be of general application and not refer only
to cotton goods. It would have been preferable to give these
safeguards a Community character.
Finally, it would perhaps have been possible to grant Hong Kong,
like the other Commonwealth countries, a certain decalage in the
introduction of the common customs tariff by Great Britain, the
details of this decalage being a matter for discussion.
c. ASSOCIATION
1. Renewal of the Convention of Association
Paragraph 11 of the statement made bn 10 October 1961 expressed
unqualified acceptance by the British Government of the objectives
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty, one of these being the policy
of association in sub-paragraph k).
Paragraph 35 of this statement, however, drew attention to the
opinion held by certain members of the Commonwealth that thepresent arrangements for association were not appropriate for
independent States. In the British view, however, this objection
might not apply to the new arrangements once they were known.
They would constitute a problem to be discussed between the
United Kingdom and the Community, which was in the process
of revising the existing association arrangements.
a)  The Community was faced with a difficulty: it had to consider
how an as yet undefined association system could be applied 
countries for which it was not yet known whether or not they
could be or wish to be associated.
The practical solution to this problem was for the Member States
to keep the United Kingdom Delegation informed of the results
of the negotiations with the Associated African States and Mada-
gascar (AASM) while these negotiations were in progress. In this
way information was exchanged on the two negotiations which
the Community was conducting.
.b ) Once they were in possession of the text, recently initialled, of
the Convention of Association, the United lZingdom Delegation
acting on a Conference decision, consulted the Commission on
certain points of the Convention which, in their opinion, needed
elucidation. The discussions on these points were still in hand
when the negotiations were suspended.
The United Kingdom Delegation had stated their agreement with
the objectives of the Association. They had explicitly agreed to
certain points, namely the measures provided for in Article 2 (2)
of the Convention, relating to the advance introduction of the
common tariff for certain tropical products. It seemed that in
regard to other matters on which they had not yet given their
agreement, the United Kingdom Delegation would have been
able to accept the results of the negotiations with the AASM.
However, the question of the United' Kingdom s participation
in the Development Fund still remained to be discussed. The.
United Kingdom Delegation had already stated that they agreed
in principle to a United I(ingdom contribution to the Fund, but
neither the size nor the procedure for this contribution, nor the.financial problems relating to an extension of the Association
had yet been discussed.
c)  The preoccupations of the United Kingdom Delegation con-
cerning the new Convention related mainly to institutional ques-
tions and to economic relations between the Associated States and
third countries. It appears unlikely that anything would have
prevented final agreement by Great Britain.
The problems of financing the Fund were more delicate inasmuch
as they were connected with those of extending the Association
itself. The basis of any solution would have had to be a fair
apportionment of the burden among all the Member States parti-
cipating in the rights and obligations of this Convention.
2. Offer of association (dependent and independent Commonwealth
countries)
The British view on the matter of association was set out in the
statement of 10 October 1961:
... in any case, we should like to see the less developed members
of the Commonwealth, and our Dependent Territories, given the
opportunity, if they so wish, to enter into a~sociation with the
Community on the same terms as those which will in future be
available to the present Associated Overseas Countries and Terri-
tories... Association may, therefore, be a solution for the problems
of many Commonwealth countries and territories..." (paras. 35, 36).
The United Kingdom Delegation had accordingly furnished a list
of the countries for which -the right of association would be
recognized. They would include all the independent and depen-
dent countries of Africa and the Caribbean and most of the other
dependent territories in the Commonwealth.
Moreover, the United Kingdom Delegation considered that an
offer of association should be made to the independent countries
of the Commo~wealth, in order that their situation might be
settled before a decision had been reached on United Kingdom
membership.a)  The nature of association is directly connected with the number
and the character of the countries taking part. It seemed there-
fore very difficult  to  recognize, a priori, a right of association for
countries  so  different geographically, economically and politically.
Thus the possibility of association should depend on certain
objective criteria. Moreover, the procedure  to  be used would be
different if the countries in question were dependent or if they were
independent. Finally, the Community had  to  conform with! the
accession clause in the new Association Convention, which pro-
vided for prior consultation without the associates having a right
of veto.
The Community was, nevertheless, prepared  to  give favourable
consideration  to  applications from independent countries having
characteristics similar  to  those of the present associates.
b)  For the dependent Commonwealth countries it seemed that
association would be the most appropriate solution in the vast
majority of cases.
The list of these countries reads as follows:
1.  Africa a.nd the Indian Ocean
Gambia, Kenya, Mauritius, Zanzibar Protectorate, Seychelles.
2.  Carib.bean
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia
St. Vincent, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, British Honduras
British Guiana, British Virgin Islands, Bahamas, Bermuda, Cay-
man Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands.
3.  Pacific 
Fiji, Tonga, Pitcairn Islands Group, British Solomon Islands
Protectorate, Central and Southern Line Islands, Gilbert and
Ellice Islands (including the Phoenix and Northern Line Islands
Groups), (New Hebrides Condominium).
4.  South Atlantic
St. Helena and Dependencies, British Antarctic Territory, Falk-
land Islands and Dependencies.After the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the
United Kingdom Delegation had expressed the opinion that asso-
ciation under Part IV of the Treaty would probably be an accept-
able solution for most of the dependent countries on this list. 
appears that at the time when negotiations were adjourned the
United Kingdom had not been able to hold consultations that
would have been necessary before decisions could be reached in
this matter.
c)  As regards the independent countries of Mrica and the Carib-
bean and those about to attain independence, it was agreed that, if
they so wished, association under the new Convention would
constitute in principle an appropriate solution for the problems
involved in the United Kingdom s accession and that consultations
would take place in due course between the Member States of the
Community and the British Government with a view to such
association.
In the event of certain of these countries not being associated
other arrangements would be sought.
Subsequently three countries namely Ghana, Nigeria and Tan-
ganyika, declared that association would not be an acceptable
formula for them. Moreover, Nigeria and Tanganyika suggested
that the possibility of trade agreements with them should be con-
sidered, while Kenya reserved its position for the time being.
3. Alternative solution to association
In his Paris statementof10 October 1961 Mr. Heath had envisaged
the possibility that it might not prove possible to associate certain
countries of the Commonwealth, and had pointed out the gravity
of the problem which such a situation would bring about since, as
he said: "They would certainly not understand if, as a result of
becoming a member of the Community, the United Kingdom
were obliged to discriminate against them in favour of other non-
European countries" (para. 34).
The solution suggested in this case was either to grant them, as in
the past, duty-free admission to the British market, by analogywith the arrangement adopted for Franco-Moroccan trade and for
trade between Surinam and the Benelux countries, or to make
suitable ar:rangements for each product separately.
a)  Following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference
at which the independent countries to whom association was
offered had rejected it (with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago
which favoured association, and Sierra Leone and Jamaica, which
reserved their position), the United Kingdom Delegation con-
sulted the Member States of the Community with regard to the
alternative arrangement which the Conference had agreed to seek
in this event.
On this point the British asked that:
i)  The possibility of association at a later date be kept open;
ii)  A statement be made to the effect that in due course the en-
larged Community would be prepared to negotiate trade agree-
ments with those Commonwealth countries which were not
associated;
Hi)  An endeavour be made to minimize the possible damage to
these countries by reducing or abolishing certain duties in the
common tariff and by maintaining the present system for imports
from these countries into the United Kingdom, subject to trade
agreements to be concluded between these countries and the
Community.
b)  It was becoming clear that a number of Commonwealth coun-
tries would not wish to accept association, and this would certainly
raise difficulties both with regard to the future of the Association
itself and with regard to the establishment Qf harmonious relations
between the enlarged Community and Mrica as a whole.
Moreover, there could be no question of granting countries who
refused association, by means of trade ~greements, advantages
equal to those conferred by association.
Any tariff concessions going beyond the decreases decided upon in
the negptiations with the AASM raised very great problems.
Similarly, to waive the introduction of the common tariff forgoods originating in these countries for an indefinite interim period
would have been a major departure from the rules of the Treaty.
It was therefore desirable to give these countries time to reconsider
their position, and in this connection to envisage .a progressive
implementation of the common tariff applicable to imports 
their goods into the United Kingdom, by 1Ileans of a "soft"
decalage.
c)  Following a proposal by the Commission, al1 agreement on the
arrangements to be made for the Commonwealth countries which
had decided not to apply for association was reached on the
following lines:
i)  The possibility of association would remain open to these coun-
tries on the basis of Article 58 of the new Convention of Asso-
ciation.
ii)  Trade agreements could be concluded between the enlarged
Community and these countries. These agreements would not
confer the same advantages as association, and they would not go
as far as the agreements to be concluded with India and Pakistan.
The scope of these agreements would be considered late!:;
iii)  Imports from these countries into the United Kingdom would
benefit from the system of "soft" decalage in the alignment of the
British tariff with the common customs tariff as agreed for manu-
factured goods from India, Ceylon and Pakistan.
The agreement reached seems fair and satisfactory, one of its main
advantages being a certain flexibility of timing which leaves open
various possibilities.
4. Tropical products
Paragraph 37 of the statement made on 10 October 1961 offered
an alternative solution for the problem of tropical products from
those Commonwealth countries which remained unassociated:
i)  Either to grant free entry into the United Kingdom market
alone for the Commonwealth country or territory which is not
associated, and then to fix the common tariff at a level which wouldsafeguard the interests both of that country and of the countries
and territories associated with the Community;
ii)  Or to fix at zero or at a very low level the common tariff for
a limited number of products.
The relevant proposals concerned a dozen products or groups 
products. The requests for zero duties (tea, wood, cocoa, palm
oil, spices, etc.) would correspond in value to about 40 % of all
United Kingdom imports of tropical products, while the requests
for lower duties (coffee, vegetable oils, pineapples and pineapple
products, etc.) or for tariff quotas would represent a little over
10 % of these imports.
These requests related to all main agricultural exports of the
African and Asian Commonwealth countries and consequently were
of direct concern to those of the Associated States. On the other
hand, the duties on the more important West Indian products (in
particular. bananas) were in general unaffected. One product was
even the subject of a request for an increased duty (lime oil).
a)  The British requests were in fact directed at a complete trans-
formation of the common tariff relating to tropical products and
went far beyond the tariff reductions envisaged under the new
Convention of Association. Furthermore, it seemed hardly logi-
cal to modify the common tariff to accomodate the interests of
countries to whom the possibility of association had been offered
when it was not even known whether fuey would in fact be asso-
ciated.
Consequently, the requests relating to
major concern to the 'ilssociates could
consideration.
products which were of
not be given favourable
b)  An agree!:lent was reached on the suspension of duties on tea
woods (under the procedure laid down w~en list G was being nego-
tiated) and certain products of very secondary interest to the AASM
(such as cashew nuts, ginger, sandalwood oil, etc.
For the other tropical products of interest to the Commonwealth
countries which could not be associated, it was agreed that exportsto the United Kingdom could benefit from the "soft'~ decalage
introducing the common tariff in accordance with the timing laid
down for manufactures from India, Ceylon and Pakistan.
Only one category of tropical products remained to be examined
namely semi-processed cocoa products, for which the United
Kingdom Delegation requested a reduction equal to that agreed
for cocoa beans in the course of the negotiations with the AASM.
This request did not appear to be unjustified or unacceptable.
D. OTHER COMMONWEALTH. COUNTRIES
1. Basutohind, Becbuanaland and Swaziland
For these territories, which are under the authority of a United
Kingdom High Commissioner, the United Kingdom Delegation
had asked for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.
The difficulty lay mainly in the fact that these territories are in-
cluded in the South African Customs Union and that certain tech-
nical problems arise in determining the origin of the goods and in
the obligation flowing from Articles 132 and 133 of the Treaty of
Rome..
After numerous discussions at both working party and Deputies
level, it was agreed to apply to these territories a system similar
to that in the Protocol to the Treaty relating to goods originating
in and coming from certain countries and enjoying special treat-
ment on importation into one of the Member States.
2. Aden
The United Kingdom Delegation had expressed the wish that Aden
also might be associated under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.
The Six, had no objection to this in principle; but in view of
Aden s geographical position and special situation with regard 
oil they were inclined to consider an ad hoc protocol.
At the thirteenth Ministerial Meeting of 15, 16 and 17 November
the Confetence agreed upon the following arrangements:i)  Upon the United Kingdom s accession to the EEC, Aden could
be associated, subject to the conclusion of a protocol ,on the export
of petroleum products to the BEC;
ii)  The provisions of this protocol, which should provide a fair
arrangement in this field, could be adopted on an ad hoc basis at
a later stage;
Iii)  Pending the conclusion of this protocol, Aden s petroleum
products would be subject to the arrangements applicable to third
countries;
iv)  If any changes occurred in the status of Aden, the position of
this territory would have to be re-examined.
3. Federation of Malaysia
As regards the proposed Federation of Malaysia, a major exporter
of products on which the duty in the common custofD;s tariff 
already at zero, the problems raised by Great Britain's accession
would seem to have been of secondary importance.
The Community, however, was prepared to consider negotiations
for a trade agreement with the Federation of Malaysia if the latter
so requested and if it proved necessary in order to maintain and
develop mutual trade.
Exports from the Federation of Malaysia to the United Kingdom
would furthermore have enjoyed the same decalage as that laid
down for India ~Pakistan and Ceylon.
4. Malta
Malta enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy. Its constitution
lays down, however, that the United Kingdom shall retain certain
rights regarding foreign policy (Article ~3 of the Constitution of
Malta). '
The United Kingdom Delegation stated on several occasions that
they were prepared to give Malta the necessary powers to nego-
tiate for association with the Community under Article 238 of theT~eaty. Those powers would extend to carrying out any agree-
ment concluded.
Among the Six, however, it was considered ,that Malta s consti-
tutional position might still give rise to legal uncertainties or diffi-
culties. Consequently it was suggested that a transitional solution
should be adopted for Malta.
In this connection, the Six proposed that a special protocol be
drawn up providing for the possibility of association at a later date
when the constitutional position of Malta so permitted.
The protocol might include elements of a customs union. 
could be negotiated between the Community and the United King-
dom Government, but the possibility was left open that the United
Kingdom Government might invite the Maltese authorities to take
part in these negotiation,s.
At the fifteenth Ministerial Meeting the Lord Privy Seal, after
consulting the Government of Malta, said he was prepared to
accept the proposals of the Six.
5. Cyprus
The Government of Cyprus addressed .a letter dated 10 December
1962 to the President of the Council asking that negotiations be
opened with a view to reaching an agreement on association with
the European Economic Community in accordance with Arti-
cle 238 of the Treaty of Rome.
At its session on 24 January, the Council of Ministers agreed to
initiate the appropriate procedure for these negotiations.
6. Gibraltar
The United Kingdom Delegation had submitted a proposal re-
garding an arrangement for Gibraltar in which it was suggested
that in due course Gibraltar should become an integral part of the
Community ( (Article 227 (4) J. The British Government, however
suggested that an interim period of a few years should be de-yotedto more intensive examination of the problems presented by this
territory. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom Delegation proposed
that Article 227 (4) should not be applied immediately following
Great Britain's accession to the Community. As a result, Great
Britain wished that no changes should be made in the customs
treatment at present applied to imports of goods originating in or
coming from Gibraltar.
The Six did not have the opportunity to study these proposals
which admittedly raised problems  of  principle but not insurmount-
able difficulties, having regard to the scale of the problem.
7. Federation of Rhodesia and N yasaland
At the time  of  the negotiations, the Federation  of  Rhodesia and
Nyasaland was in a rather special constitutional situation. In
these circumstances, the problems which Great Britain's accession
could raise were approached in a special way. Up to the time
when the negotiations were suspended, detailed study had not
been possible (neither had it been possible to discuss the tobacco
problem, which is important for this country).
E.  STATES NOT BELONGING TO THE COMMONWEALTH
BUT ENJOYING COMMONWEALTH PREFERENCE
These are Burma, various Arab States and-most important of
all-South Africa (1). These States, although not members  of  the
Commonwealth, benefit  from  the British preferential tariff.
A problem with regard to the alignment of the British preferential
tariff with the common customs tariff would have arisen in parti-
cular for South Africa, which sends considerable exports to the
United Kingdorp.. The views of the South African Minister of
Economic Affairs were heard on 20 November and South Africa
had sent a memorandum to the Conferenc~. Up to the time when
the negotiations were suspended these problems had not yet been
studied in substance.
(1) Ireland also comes into this category, but the case of this country came up in a different
context, as it had applied for membership of the Community (see Chap. VI).It does not appear, however, that transitional solutions based on
the technical elements of the problem would have been impossible.
F. PROBLEMS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND OF
COMMONWEALTH PREFERENCE
1. Decalage
As has been explained in the previous sections, the Six had agreed
with the United Kingdom Delegation that the phasing by which
the British preferential tariff was to be adapted to the common cus-
toms tariff should in many cases be different from that stipulated in
Article 23 of the Treaty of Rome. The scope and content of this
proposal, which was put forward by the Commission, have already
been indicated; in particular Great Britain would have had to
effect a first alignment of its preferential tariff immediately upon
joining the EEC, and would have had to apply the common
customs tariff in full not later than 1 January 1970. Nevertheless
there was reason to fear that the decalages might lead to deflections
of trade in certain cases and in certain years inasmuch as the
rigidly parallel development provided for in the Treaty of Rome
between the diminution of intra-Community duties and the align-
ment. of national duties with the common customs tariff would be
waived for a considerable proportion of British imports.
a)  This disparity during all or part of the transitional period raised
the problem of goods imported into Great Britain under these
special arrangements being assimilated to goods imported under
the normal provisions of the Treaty. If they were so assimilated
the effect might be that the Member States would have eX,cessive
recourse to the safeguard measures provided for in Article 115 of
the Treaty and in practice this might have undermined the prin-
ciple of the free movement of goods within the  Community, or
even have led to the isolation of the British market for certain pro-
ducts. On the other hand, there was no reason to exaggerate the
problem, particularly as it was by its nature transitional.
Although the Conference was aware of these questions, the Six had
settled them neither among themselves nor with the United King-
dom Delegation when the negotiations were suspended.b)  A possible solution, making broad use of the institutional pro-
cedures provided by the Treaty, might have been as follows:
i)  In principle goods imported from Commonwealth countries
and benefiting from the decalage would have been considered as
beign in free circulation within the meaning of Articles 9 (2) and
10 (1).; in other words, these goods would have enjoyed the benefit
of the intra-Community quota and tariff system on importation
into a Member State.
ii)  Special arrangements would have been introduced for the whole
part of the transitional period for any items in which deflections
of trade via the United I(ingdom of goods originating in Common-
wealth countries and territories enjoying benefit of the decalage
threatened to cause serious disturbance on the markets of the other
Member States. The list of these items would have had to be
established having regard not only to the value during the transi-
tional period of the tariff benefit arising from the deflection via the
United Kingdom, but also to the scale, as compared with Com-
munity consumption, of the United Kingdom s imports from the
Commonwealth countries and territories enjoying benefit of the decalage. 
The list of products subject to a special arrangement would initially
have been established in the treaty of accession, but could have
been altered subsequently by a decision of the Council on a propo-
sal from the Commission.
Any product included in the list for a given period would have
been barred, if exported from the United Kingdom during this
period, from the benefit of free circulation within the meaning of
Articles 9 (2) and 10 (1) of the Treaty of Rome, unless the United
Kingdom could furnish satisfactory proof that the product did not
originate in- a Commonwealth country or territory benefiting from
the decalage.
iii)  In the event of an abnormal growth of the United I(ingdom
exports to the rest of the Community of a product not on the list
the British Government would have been required to take appro-
priate action.If such action proved inadequate, the Council, Qn a proposal from
the Commission and acting by a qualified majority, could have
decided on other measures. In particular, it could have excluded
the product in question from the benefit of free circulation under
the conditions referred to above; failing this, after two months had
elapsed, Member States could have resorted to Article 115.
c)  The Conference also agreed to review, at a final stage, the differ-
ent decalage systems which hag been planned. Here, the ques-
tion of harmonizing them in the interests of simplification would
have had to be considered not only in relation to the problems
described above, but also according to the countries and products
concerned. These technical questions remained unsettled.
2. Preferences granted by the Commonwealth countries to Great
Britain
The decalage system was in most cases an adequate solution to the
problems raised by the existence of preferences on the British market
in favour of the Commonwealth countries.  It  should, however
be recalled that Commonwealth preference includes some measure
of reciprocity: the Commonwealth countries themselves grant
Great Britain preferences, which are in some cases of substantial
importance for its own exports.
These preferences vary widely from country to country and from
product to product, and only a thorough study would have revealed
exactly how far they prejudiced equality of competitive conditions
for the various Member States on external markets.
It seems that once the question had been raised some arrange-
ment should have been made concerning the procedure for dealing
with it, possibly in connection with the discussions to be held later
at GATT; though the economic interests at issue were mainly
those of Great Britain, the decision in legal terms could only lie
with the various Commonwealth countries, which control their
own customs tariffs.G.  COMMONWEALTH AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
Temperate foodstuffs
At the outset of the negotiations the;British Government drew
attention to the importance for the Commonwealth countries of
their exports of temperate foodstuffs. The United Kingdom had
both moral and contractual obligations to fulfil, and was faced with
the problem of reconciling its obligations to the Commonwealth
with; participation in a common agricultural policy. In order to
solve this problem, the United Kingdom proposed that special pro...
visions be worked out whereby the Commonwealth countries
might count on outlets for their products comparable to those they
already enjoyed.
1. In so far as the United Kingdom was seeking a permanent
solution to the problem of the exporting Commonwealth coun-
tries, the objections of the Six to the British concept were twofold:
a)  In the first place it seemed to them difficult in view of the world-
wide aspect of the problem to consider these countries' difficulties
in isolation. They pointed out that the enlarged Community when
it included the United I~ingdom would constitu~e the largest
importing bl9C in the world. Its wheat imports would amount to
approximately half of the total world commercial imports; for
dairy produce, the figure would be two-thirds; for meat, three-
quarters; for sugar, a third.
This decisive position in world trade imposed on the enlarged
Community a heavier responsibility of which it must be aware.
b)  In the second place, exceptions in the uniform protective system
which was to be applied to trade with non-member countries under
the common agricultural policy~exceptions which the United
Kingdom hoped to obtain in the interests of its trade with the
Commonwealth~would compromise the satisfactory operation of
the common agricultural policy and might in fact result in the
British agricultural market being isolated from the market of other
Community countries.~oreover, such exceptions would of necessity be quantitative in
nature, and this did not conform with the principles of the common
agricultural policy.
In the light of these considerations, the starting point of the Six in
these discussions was therefore that Commonwealth problems were
not to be given a permanent solution by means ~f specific measures
in favour of those countries alone. A permanent solution could
only be sought within a world-wide context.
However, if the exporting countries of the Commonwealth ran
into difficulties in adapting themselves, the Six indicated their
willingness to seek transitional solutions taking into account any
real difficulties which might arise and thus permitting a progressive
adaptation of the Commonwealth countries concerned to the new
situation created by Great Britain's entry into the Community.
2. It was on the basis of the Commission s proposals that a large
!D.easure of agreement on the broad lines of a long-term solution
and of the transitional measures, in. particular for cereals, was
reached at the tenth Ministerial Meeting of 1-5 August 1962.
a)  As regards the long-term solution, the agreement provided that
the enlarged Community should take the initiative of calling as
soon as possible, and preferably in 1963, an international conference
of the principal exporting and importing countries in order to
reach world-wide agreements for cereals, meat, dairy produce and
sugar.
i)  The object of this Conference would be to work out the struc-
ture of international trade in agricultural products best calculated
to ensure a balance between the interests of producers and con-
sumers in exporting and importing areas. The Conference would
among other things, deal with price and production policies, the
minimum and maximum quantities entering' international trade
stock-piling policy and trade with developing countries. The
world-wide agreements would be subject to revision every three
years and would provide for institutions to watch over their
execution.ii)  In order to avoid certain countries suffering by reason of a
breakdown of the Conference due to the attitude of other third
countries, it was proposed that the Community should in these
circumstances be prepared to enter into consultations with a view
to concluding agreements with such of the importing and export-
ing countries~and particularly with those of the Co1Iltnonwealth~
as would have been pr~pared to conclude world-wide agreements
on the same basis as the enlarged Community.
iii) In view of the impact of price policy on the volume of pro-
duction and thus on the outlets available to exporting countries
it was provided that the Community, upon or even before the
accession of the United Kingdom, should make a declaration ex-
pressing its intention to define its price policy as soon as possible
and to pursue a reasonable price policy in conformity with the
objectives of Articles  110  and 39 of the Treaty of Rome. As.
regards this price policy of the enlarged Community, there was.
still however a difference of opinion. The United Kingdom Dele-
gation took the view that the Community should state more explic-
itly its intention to take full account in its price policy o( the
interests of third countries and in particular of those Common-
wealth countries which would be important suppliers of the Mem-
ber States of the enlarged Community.
b) Pending the conclusion of world-wide agreements or, failing
this, agreements' of more limited geographical scope, and at most
for the transitional period of the Treaty of Rome, provision was
made for transitional measures which would mitigate for the
Commonwealth countries the possible consequences of the pro-
gressive implementation of the common agricultural policy in
respect of cereals and flour, dairy produce, meat and sugar.
i)  The solution proposed on 5 August specified these measures
for cereals. The Community recalled first of all its intention to fix
the standard reductions (1) in such a way as not to cauSe any abrupt
and significant shift in trade flows. If, however, the application of
the standard reduction were to cause such a shift in the United
(1)  .Abattements jorjaitairesKingdom market ' the Community undertook to review the way
in which this standard reduction would be applied after consul-
tation with the Commonwealth countries.
Moreover, in the event of there being at the time any tariff prefer-
ence for cereals, the United Kingdom 'Would be entitled to allow
imports from the Commonwealth countries to benefit in its market
from part of the standard reduction applicable between Member
States, phasing it out by the end of the transitional period. There
wa~ still, however, some difference of opinion on how this phasing-
out process should be applied. 
ii)  It was provided that measures of the same type could 
. adopted for those other products to which a levy system would be
applied. These products would be studied in detail at a later stage
in the negotiations.
3. The United Kingdom Government had, moreover, formulated
the following requests:
For beef and veal..  Having regard to the agreements with Australia
and New Zealand, unlimited entry into Britain at the present pref-
erential tariff until 30 September 1967 , and thereafter preferential
tariff quotas based on a recent reference period. The United
Kingdom also requested a "soft" decalage for the introduction of
the common customs tariff in respect of the Commonwealth
countries.
For mutton and lamb..  Pending the establishment of the common
agricultural policy for these products, authorization to suspend the
introduction of the common customs tariff and to maintain its own
deficiency payments system.
If in the course of the periodic reviews that were to be instituted
the Commission should find that the market for these meats was
adversely affecting the market price of other meats, the United
Kingdom would take appropriate measures; these, in any case,
should not be incompatible with its obligations under the agree-
ments with Australia and New Zealand.. 64
Finally the common agricultural policy for these products should
ensure the Commonwealth countries satisfactory outlets in the
. enlarged Community and maintain an adequate level of income
for Community producers.
For sugar..  That it be allowed to continue to operate the Common-
wealth Sugar Agre~ment until the end of 1969 and possibly prolong
it after consulting the Community.
For flour..  That the fixed component of the levy be reduced and
implemented progressively at the reduced rate.
4. As has been pointed out a number of points were still awaiting
decision.
i)  With regard to the long-term solution, the first point was the
price policy of the enlarged Community. It would seem, how-
ever, that the paragraph in question already expressed satisfactorily
the Community s repeatedly confirmed intention of taking full
account of its external responsibilities. The British request that
a distinction be made between traditional suppliers and the other
third countries would have led \ to discrimination contrary to tl?-e
letter and the spirit of international trade agreements.
ii)  As regards the divergence of views on that part of the standard
reduction to be granted the Commonwealth countries during the
transitional period, this p~t was of relative importance. Since
the Seven were in agreement both on the principle that the United
King~om could e~tend to its imports from the Commonwealth
the benefit of the standard reduction arrangements in force between
the Member States and on the fact that this advantage would be
tapered off, it should have been possible to find an agreement on
exactly how this would be done to make sure that the Common-
wealth countries received satisfactory treatment without being put
on the same footing as Member States of the Community.
Hi:;  The British requests concerning the other products referred to
above were of fairly wide scope and often difficult to accept. For
dairy produce and sugar, it was moreover difficult to discern
solutions inasmuch as the common agricultural policy was not yetdefined. It seems, however, that it would not have been impos-
sible to meet the needs of the Commonwealth countries by adopt-
ing, as had been suggested, some of the measures put forward on
5 August, particularly for cereals. It is, of course, evident that
this was a general principle and its application to dairy produce
and sugar w?uld still have to be discussed in full and would depend
in particular on the actual machinery used (levies for instance);
this had not yet been settled under the common agricultural
policy.
For beef and veal, the same approach could have been followed;
.on the basis of the decisions which would have defined the common
agricultural policy for these products possible analogies with the
:arrangements already proposed on 5 August could have been
found.
For mutton and lamb, it would have been possible to put forward
a satisfactory solution based primarily on Article 25 of the Treaty
of Rome. 
Other farm products of interest to the Commonwealth
1. The United Kingdom Delegation had also submitted anum-
her of requests for preferential or special treatment covering a
large variety of less important products from the Commonwealth.
These fucluded:
i)  Levy-free quotas for pigmeat and eggs;
ii)  Duty-free quotas for apples and pears from Canada, Australia
and New Zealand and for tobacco from Canada and India;
Hi)  A preferential 'tariff quota for wine from Australia;
iv)  Changes in the common customs tariff for oranges, grape-fruit
food preparations of tapioca and sago and Cheddar cheese (for the
latter the gradual application of thecommoQ. customs tariff had
also been requested);
v)  A reduction in the fixed components of the levy and a "soft
decalage for the application of this levy to manioc, sago, tapioca,-
arrowroot and similar products; vi)  The application to rice of the same system as that laid down
for cereals from Commonwealth countries which enjoyed a tariff
preference. '
2. In general, the Six had not taken any specific stand on these
requests nor had they been discussed at length in the Conference.
It would seem that a decalage solution could have been sought for
these products in so far as they are liable to duties, and that ar-
rangements analagous to those put forward on 5 August for certain
cereals duril1g the transitional period could have been applied in
cases where they are subject to a levy system.
The case of New Zealand
1. In that part of his statement of 10 October 1961 relating to the
problems of the Commonwealth, Mr. Heath had pointed out in
particular that New Zealand was likely to suffer grave prejudice if
it could not be assured in the future by one means or another of
comparable outlets for its products. 
At the Ministerial Meeting of 1-5 August 1962, statements had
come frqm among the Six which suggested that they recognized
the existence and importance of this problem. However, as
discussions oil the matter among the Six had not been concluded,
there was no discussion with the United Kingdom Delegation on
the substance.
2. The Commission holds that New Zealand's special situation
can be recognized as regards butter, because of butter s place in
that country s exports and the particularly difficult position of this
product on world mark.ets. In this connection the Commission
considers that the Conference should have sought the best practical
means by which New Zealand could gradually adjust itself to the
new situation that would have been created by United Kingdom
membership of the Common Market.
It must however be recqgnized that a complete appraisal of any
solution consonant with such an objective would depend on the
Community itself having first defined more clearly the commonpolicy to be followed in the dairy- produce sector and-inasmuch
as the implementing details would have included financial aspects-
that agreement had been possible on the financial regulation under
the common agricultural policy.
More generally, it should be noted that although it had already
proved possible to envisage\ broad agreement 011 the lines along
which the problems raised by Commonwealth agricultural exports
were to be solved, certain elements required for the implementation
of these solutions still did not exist. This was particularly the
case with these products on which the Cotntnunity had not fixed
its policy-a problem dealt with in ChapterID below-and with
the interpretation of the financial regulation, a subject dealt with
in Chapter IV.CHAPTER III
United Kingdom agriculture
In his statement of 10 October 1961 Mr. Heath had said that the
United Kingdom was in full agreement with the aims proposed by
the Treaty of Rome with regard to agriculture, that Great Britain
was prepared to participate in a common agricultural policy and
fully accepted that the Common Market must extend to agriculture
and trade inagricultural products (para. 47). "This, however, poses
big problems for us." (para. 48).
Mr. Heath then pointed out the peculiarities of the agricultural
system in Great Britain, in particular the existence of direct subsi-
dies and guaranteed prices, and mentioned the special problems
which the United Kingdom would face in the sphere of agriculture
when it became a member of the Community. In view of these
problems, the British Government asked for arrangements to
cover an annual review and guarantees for farmers and to allow
for the gradual introduction of the changes required in the British
agricultural system in order to integrate it into the Common Market. 
After the first decisions on the common agricultural policy had
been taken in January 1962, Mr. Heath said that although the
United Kingdom had not taken part in formulating these decisions
it would accept the common policy as set out in the regulations
subject to adjustments which would have to be made to allow for
the increased size of the Community.
A.  ANNUAL REVIEW AND GUARANTEES TO
COMMUNITY FARMERS
1. In the opinion of the United Kingdom Delegation the annual
review would have to be based on national reviews carried out by
the Member States. The results of these reviews would be com-
municated to the Commission, together with any observations
which the Member States might wish to put forward, the Commis-sion itself drawing up ,the annual Community review on the basis
of these facts and of information from any other sources.
One point to be cov~red by the annual review would be the trend
of farm income in relation to total national income in each Member
State. If this review showed that the agricultural population of
any member country was not assured a fair standard of living, it
would be for the Commission, at the request of that member
country, to submit to the Council proposals by which the situation
-could be remedied.
2. The Six had received the idea of an annual review with favour.
They emphasized, however, that the survey of incomes should be
made .at Community rather than nation~l level and that the Com-
mission should be free to decide whether the results of this review
called for any measures; such measures should, moreover, be of
a Community natUre. 
3. At the ninth Meeting on 20 and 21 July 1962, the Conference
adopted a composite decision which covered both the British re-
quest for an annual review and the British request for guarantees
to Community farmers. This laid down that the annual review
of the sitUation and of the economic prospects of agriculture in the
Community would be made by the Commission, independently of
any reviews which might be carried out by Member States. The
decision specified the information to be supplied to the Commis-
sion by the Member States for the purposes of this review, which
would include details on the sitUation during the year under re-
view, numbers engaged in agricultUre, the trend of profits from
farming, the trend of the individual earnings of those engaged in
agriculture, and the financial aspects of the common agricultural
policy.
The Commission would report the results of ' the annual Commu-
nity review to the Council of Ministers and would make any
appropriate proposals to the Council. These results would also
be used in the decisions on the implementation of the common
agricultural policy.Finally, it was laid down that if the annual review showed that
agricultural income was not providing a fair standard of living in
accordance with the objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty for the
farming population of the Comniunity or of particular areas, the
Commission would take up the question and make proposals within
the context of the Gommon agricultural policy for remedying the
situation.
B.  INTEGRATION OF UNITED KINGDOM AGRICULTURE
In his statement on the first agricultural policy decisions, Mr. Heath
had said that the British Government .accepted these regulations,
subject to the adjustments that would be necessary:
a)  To allow for the drastic change in the supply and demand
~~tuation within the Community as a whole resulting from the
accession of the United Kingdom and certain other countries;
b)  To meet the Commonwealth countries' vital needs and to
enable the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations to the Com-
monwealth;
c)  To enable the system in force in the United Kingdom to be
harmonized smoothly and gradually with the new system to be
established;
d)  To expand the regulations on certain points.
Regulations on the organization of the cereals, pigmeat and egg markets
1. Problems concerning these products arose mainly from the
fact that the United Kingdom s agricultural support system is not
the same as the system established under the common agricultural
policy.
the Community system, protection at the frontier ensures remu-
n erative' prices for farmers. These pri~es are, however, subject
to certain fluctuations.
On. the United Kingdom Market, on the other hand, prices of farm
products are formed freely under the influence of world prices.Thanks to the system of deficiency payments, United Kingdom
producers enjoy guaranteed prices fixed annually by the Govern-
ment. 
These differences underlie the United Kingdom Delegation
requests for adjustments in the sectors of cereals and processed
products; these spring from the British desire:
a)  To ensure that the gap between consumer and producer price
levels is reduced gradually, and so to avoid the harmful effects for
the British economy of a sudden sharp rise in consumer prices
which would result if these regulations were implemented as they
stand;
b)  To retain temporarily the price guarantees to British farmers;
c)  To respect the pledges made by the British Government for the
lifetime of the present Parliament.
2. According to the United Kingdom Delegation, these require-
ments could have been met by retaining the guaranteed prices, and
the deficiency payments calculated from them, for the duration 0 f
the transitional period (1
Within this system, the British Government was prepared for
British consumer and producer prices to be aligned progressively
on Community prices.
In general, the United Kingdom Delegation stressed that to adapt
its agricultural system to the Community system their country
would h~ve to make far more substantial adjustments and more
radical changes than any of the Six, and consequently they asked
for a longer transitional period for the United Kingdom, at least in
respect of certain products. The d€sire of the British side to give
their farmers greater certainty as regards prices prompted a further
request for additional measures to be introduced into the common
agricultural policy.
(1) Subject to certain details particularly as regards the length of time which the United Kingdom
Delegation proposed during the last phase of the negotiations for the retention of this system.3. In addition to these requests, ,which applied to all the products,
in question, the British GoverntIlent asked specifically for the:
following:
a)  Wheat:  The United Kingdom asked that the lower limit of the'
target price bracket be moved downwards to include a price cor-
responding to the guaranteed British price at the wholesale stage.
The aim was to avoid the difficulties which an increase in price-
would create for the volume of production and the present struc-
ture of British agriculture. Such difficulties would be additional
to those suffered by consumers and producers of processed pro-
ducts through the alignment of consumer on producer prices.
The United Kindg01Il further wished to carry out this alignment
in two stages, the first at the beginning of the crop year following.
accession, the second one year later.
United Kingdom prices would from then onwards be fixed in con~.
formity with the regulation on cereals.
b)  ~arley  : Since the target price corresponding to the British
guaranteed prices lay within t4e current targe~ price bracket valid
in the Community, the United Kingdom s only request was that it
should align its market prices on producer prices over a period 
three to four years after accession.
This request reflected the desire to raise the .market price of barley
gradually in view of the repercussions of such a rise on the prices.
of the processed products.
c)  Oats:  The United Kingdom asked, in view of its considerable
output of this cereal, that the regulation on cereals be amended to
enable target prices and intervention prices for oats to be fixed in
those Member States which are major producers of oats.
d)  Pigmeat:  In order to avoid a sudden excessive rise in the market
price, the United Kingdom wished to raise it gradually in the-
following manner:
i)  In the first year following accession, from the present level to at
least 230 DM per 100 kg.ii)  In t~e following six months, to 244 DM.
iii)  By 5 % each year thereafter.
Under this scheme, deficiency payments would be retained until
the mark~t price reached the level of the price guaranteed to
British producers.
For the single market stage, the United Kingdom Delegation asked
for Article 9 (2) of the regulation on pigmeat to be strengthened
in such a way as to provide for immediate intervention measures
instead of leaving it to the Community s institutions to decide on
the advisability of such. measures. The proceddre for applying
them could be decided at a later date.
This request was based on the argument that the enlarged Com-
m11t1ity would include all the roain importers and exporters of pig-
meat and that consequently supply and demand within the con-
fines of the Community  would be the determining factor in the
price of this meat. This meant that major market fluctuations
could occur if there were no machinery to cope with them.
e)  Eggs:  In order to permit of gradual adjustment, the United
Kingdom asked for step-by-step abolition of deficiency payments
over a prolonged transitional period. The timing would have to
be decided largely in the light of movements of feed grain prices
the rise in which, the British thought, should be absorbed by the
producer himself.
The United Kingdom Delegation also asked that the regulation on
eggs be altered to permit of market intervention on\ a national
basis during the transitional period and on a Community basis at
the single market stage. Such intervention would be optional
and related to a guide price. 
The United Kingdom considered that the present system would
not offer effective means of combating excessive fluctuations.
4. The Six were not able to accept all these British requests.
Wishing to ensure that the British system would be adjusted in a
way compatible with the principles and the time-table of the com-mon .agricultural policy, they informed the United Kingdom Dele-
gation that:
a)  The common agricultural policy must be applied in its entirety
by the United Kingdom by the end of the transitional period;
.b)  The system of deficiency payments granted on the 
basis of a guaranteed price must be abolished at the very beginning of the
transitional period in respect of all products for which common regulations existed. The Six stated~ however, that they were aware of the British Government's pledges to Parliament on this
issue and declared their readiness to consider appropriate measures
within the limits of these pledges. 
c)  sy-stem of degressive subsidies to consumers or-if these involved major difficulties-to producers would provide a solution
~o any difficulties~ such as a sudden and excessive rise in consumer prices, which might result from the move from one system to the other.
On the basis of these principles it would have been possible to
apply the common agricultural policy to Great Britain and still
avoid any serious difficulties for the British economy.
On the other hand the Six considered that if they accepted the
British request to maintain their guaranteed prices and' deficiency payments, the British national system would continue alongside the system worked out by the other six Member States under the
agricultural policy. This would have meant taking considerable liberties with this policy and would have led to a discrimination between Community producers that was incompatible with the
Treaty of Rome. Such discrimination could well' have developed
into distortion of competition between British and other Com~ munity producers.
As regards the British request to prolong the transitional period
the Six pointed out that, given the structure of British agriculture
they did not see that adapting the British system would raise any
particular difficulties justifying an extension of the transitional period. ' Moreover, the date of 31 December 1969 was based onthe Treaty itself, and any extension would have amounted to an
alteration to the Treaty and would have prevented the common
-agricultural market from being set up within the prescribed time.
As regards the British requests concerning the various products
the Six raised the following difficulties:
a)  Wheat..  The Six emphasized that a downward adjustment of the
lower limits of the target price bracket would make harmonization
-of prices more difficUlt and could affect the methods and, more
especially, the tempo of the alignment. The British proposals
would also result in there being no rise in the producer price for
wheat upon accession, and the harmonization of British prices
with Commuhity prices would start, at the earliest, 18 months after
the United Kingdom s accession.
The British proposals would amount to not establishing the full
.rate of the levy for at least 18 months, and this would constitute
-an exception in the application of the most ~mportant instrument
-of the common agricultural policy.
The Six also said that the rise in producer prices resulting from the
:application of the regulation on cereals would not be such that 
,could not be effected in one step by the United Kingdom. This
rise would also re-establish a more normal relationship between
the price of wheat and the price of the other cereals.
,On the other hand, the Six recognized the need for arrangements
to be made to meet the rise in consumer prices. They were of the
,opinion, however, that a solution could be found under Ar-
tiele 24 (3) of the regulation on cereals, which allows recourse to
consumer subsidies.
b)  Barley..  The result of the British request would have been that
:processed products could be produced in the Vnited Kingdom on
the basis of low:"cost supplies, which would lead to disparity in
,competitive conditions within the enlarged Community.
The British request would further imply an exception in the appli-
cation of the full rate of the levy for three or four years.The Six were of the opinion that the repercussions of the rise, in
the price of barley. on the cost of processed products should be
dealt with in the context of arrangements to be made for each 
these products.
c)  Oats..  The Six took note of the British request.
d)  Pigmeat..  It was pointed out by the Six that the British proposals
allowed for increasing the market price to the level of the producer
price only at a fairly distant date.
One consequence of this would have been that the exporting coun-
tries of the Six would have to continue, for a fairly long period
after the accession pf the United Kingdom, to make refunds in
order to be able to export to this market.
However, in order to avoid a sudden excessive rise in the market
price which would follow from the aforesaid application of the
regulations on cereals and pigmeat, the Six had pointed out that-
although ,this was not laid down in the regulati9n on pigmeat~
this rise could be eased by the United Kingdom granting a subsidy
of a fixed and degressive amount on its market (for example at the
slaughterhouse stage). However, the same subsidy would have
to be granted on all imported products after clearance by the
customs authorities, because it did indeed seem difficult to ask the
other six Governments to subsidize their exports to the United
Kingdom while the latter was keeping market prices artificially
low.
With reference to the British request to strengthen the machinery
for market intervention, the Six said that the regulation on pigmeat
contained all the machinery needed, and they drew attention to the
risks of over-production involved in any further machinery. It
seemed to them that the present wording of Article 9 (2) was
wisely chosen, in that it postponed such a decision to a later stage;
that  is  to say to ~ time when  it  would be possible to judge better
in the light of further knowledge and experience, what should be
laid down for the single market stage.e)  Eggs..  The Six pointed out that the British proposals did not
entail the final elimination of deficiency payments until some years
:after the end of the transitional period.
As the changeover from a guaranteed price to a price exposed to the
fluctuations of the market had to be made in any case, it seemed
that it ought to occur at the outset of the transitional period.
In addition, the maintenance of deficiency payments for another
ten years entailed a risk of over-production of eggs; the effect of
this would be felt by the producers of the Six, while British pro-
ducers continued to benefit from a guaranteed price.
The Six remarked, however, that to ease possible difficulties in
making the adjustment to the new prices, they might accept the
granting by the United Kingdom of subsidies of a fixed and de-
gressive amount, although this was not provided for in the regula-
tion on eggs. As regards the British request for an amendment
to the regulation, the Six expressed fears that the intervention
machinery proposed might give rise to a general over-production
in this particularly sensitive sector.
5. The United Kingdom had accepted without qualification the
Regulation on the Progressive Establishment of a Common Orga-
njzation of the Market in Poultry Meat, but had pointed to the
serious difficulties which poultry producers in the United Kingdom
would face if the Six s suggestions on barley, which involved a
sudden rise in. the ,market price, were adopted.
The Six did not share the United Kingdom Delegation s opinion
that serious difficulties would arise for United Kingdom poultry
producers.
6. The discussions on the integration of British agriculture were
bound to be long and difficult, for they included extremely tech-
nical matters together with more general economic and political
aspects which were closely interwoven. Moreover, although the
problem had been touched upon several times early in the nego-
tiations and more 'particularly in the summer of 1962, it must berecognized that detailed discussions on the subject did not begin.
until very late, at the end of that same year. During the first
quarter of 1962, there was scarcely any change in the initial'British
positions, whilst the Six themselves maintained their objections
to those positions. The Conference as a whole then agreed, at
the end of December, that it was necessary to look more deeply
into the whole matter.
Under the chairmanschip of M. Mansholt, Vice-President of the
Commission, a fact-finding committee set up at the fourteenth
Ministerial Meeting of the Conference considered what effects
would in fact be produced by implementing the Community
proposals and the proposals of the United Kingdom Delegation.
During the discussions at the Conference after this committee had
presented its report the Community pointed out once again that
certain compromises would probably be easier to reach if the:
United Kingdom could accept 31 December 1969 as the date for
the end of the transitional period. In reply Mr. Heath, speaking-
of the products dealt with in the committee s report (and so. .
exclu~ng horticulture), said that if it were established that suitable
arrangements could be found for the transitional period, it might
then be possible for the United Kingdom to accept the date of
31 December 1969 as the end of the transitional period for these products. 
As these various statements were made only a very short time:
before the negotiations were suspended, discussions on the, arrange-
ments in question were not pursued.
7.  a)  There is no doubt that from the Community point of view the
best arrangements for the transitional period are those which the
Six had proposed and developed in detail during the negotiations..
By providing a degree of gradualness in the developments that
would follow adjustnient of the British machinery, they would
meet the United Kingdom s real economic problems; at the same
time they would supply the most efficient means of bringing about
a genuine integration of the agricultural economies of all member
countries and of arriving at a common market by the agreed date~.b)  i)  It  is true that, in the light of certain anxieties expressed
on the British side, it would have been possible to consider granting
the United Kingdom exceptional treatment for a few years, espe-
cially for cereals. The purpose of such treatment would have
been to make it easier to adjust British market and producer prices
by dissociating Great Britain from the general system; but it would
haye raised a delicate problem as regards decisions on aligning
target prices within the Community, which would h~ve had to be
taken during the same period. If this path were chosen, it would
have been necessary to decide immediately on the price alignments
which would have had to be made in the Community during the
years when Great Britain was enjoying special treatment.
Ii)  The British request concerning oats represents a change
in the regulation on cereals, but does not seem unreasonable when
it is remembered that Great Britain is a major producer of this grain.
c)  The United Kingdom Delegation had asked for special
arrangements both for cereals and for processed foodstuffs (Pig-
meat and eggs). This double request seems to have been debat-
able. In particular, any arrangement for cereals which was satis-
factory to Great Britain and resulted in spreading the rise in prices
would have done away with all Great Britain s difficulties over
poultry and would have considerably lessened the difficulties over
pigmeat and eggs. However, the British request to retain guar-
anteed prices and deficiency payments could not be accepted, on
grounds which were developed at length by the Six during th'e
negotiations. The British system could have been replaced by
fixed subsidies which would have had to be tapered off and which
could have been granted at either the producer or the consumer
stage, according to the nature of the product..
d)  As regards the British requests to tighten, the provisions for
action at the single market stage, it is proBable that the enlarging
of the Community by the accession of the United Kingdom and
other countries would later have shown the advisability of review-
ing various points in the present provisions.Regulation establishing the market organization for fruit and vegetables
8. The United Kingdom had acc~pted the principles underlying
the regulation on fruit and vegetabl~s and the aim of a common
horticultural policy, but since successive British Governments had
given an assurance that horticulture would continue to receive
support similar to that granted to agriculture, the United Kingdom
Delegation considered that certain changes Were necessary and that
provision must be made for adjustment.
To meet the problems raised by accession to the Community, the
nitedKingdom:
a)  Asked for a standstill period of five years before the first tariff
reductions for sensitive horticultural products. , After this period
it was prepared to reduce duties over a period ending on 1 J an-
uary 1973;
b)  Wished to provide financial assistance for horticulturalists to
make the change-over easier, and wanted therefore a guarantee that
it would be free to grant such aids;
c)  Requested a period of respite before applying the measures
required under the regulations on grading, since some time would
be needed to train staff to operate these arrangements;
d)  Considered it necessary to provide, under the regulation on
fruit and vegetables, for machinery to stabilize the market and to
prevent surpluses within the Community from leading to collapse
of prices.
9. The Six. considered that in general there was no justification
for the exceptional measures which the United Kingdom Dele-
gation requested for horticulture.
a)  They noted that the situation of horticulture in the United
Kingdom was not essentially different from that in the six coun-
tries, where the period of adaptation had really begun only when
the relevant regulation came into force. They considered that
with the elimination of controls at the frontiers the United King-
dom would be faced with the same problems as the other membersof the Community. As for the United Kingdom s internal diffi-
culties over grading at home and the quality inspection of imports
they could be no greater than those which had faced most of the
countries in the Community.
With regard to the questions relating to financial assistance to be
granted to British growers, the Six referred to the facilities offered
by the Treaty of Rome.
With regard to measures for stabilization of the market, the Six
considered that Community measures could be applied if it should
prove necessary to restore a degree of balance to the market. 
this connection the Six drew attention to Article 3 (2) of the regu-
lation on fruit and vegetables which lays down that the Council
-acting on a proposal of the Commission, shall adopt the Commu-
nity rules on the operating of the markets and on commercial
transactions not later than 30 June 1964.
h)  Horticultural problems' were discussed for the last;time at the
tenth Ministerial Meeting on 24-27 July 1962.
At this meeting the Delegations maintained their respective
positions.
10. Even when due weight is given to the British observations, it
still seems that the United Kingdom could and should apply the
regulation On the organization of the fruit and vegetables market
immediately on accession. But one grave problem might arise:
if the ' tariff dismantling phases were strictly enforced, Great
Britain' s acceptance in principle of the internal reductions already
effected when it joined would at one stroke deprive British horti-
culture of approximately half the protection it had been enjoying.
The United Kingdom could therefore be authorized to remove
customs duties at a different tempo-to be fixed by common
consent-which would enable the various tariff reductions to be
made gradually. To ensure their gradual character these reduc-
tions should have started as soOn as Great Britain joined the Com-
munity, since all tariff reductions were in any case to be completed
by the expiry of the transitional period.The British request concerning financial assistance to growers does
not appear to be impracticable, and the Treaty of Rome contains
provisions allowing for such aid, subject to certain conditions and
restrictions which could have been considered in the light of the
particular case (Arts. 92 and 93).
c.  AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS IN PREP ARA TION
(D~y produce, beef, rice sugar)
1.  A procedure was first established for the exchange of infor-
mation on the products under discussion in the EEC Council
(dairy produce, beef and rice); this procedure included contacts
between the United Kingdom Delegation and the Commission.
After learning the Commission s proposals for the common
organization of markets in these sectors, the United Kingdom
Delegation made several comments.
a)  In connection with milk and dairy products, the main British
requests were as follows:
i)  That the Community system of protection be based not on the-
present abnormally low world prices, but on a price that would
ensure a reasonable income to efficient and economic producers
such as New Zealand;
Ii)  That if safeguard clauses were applied in the form of quantita-
tive restrictions, these should not affect the volume of Common-
wealth exports to the British market;
Hi)  That the British market for fresh milk should be isolated and
the sales price of this milk provisionally kept at a level considerably
above that obtaining in the other Community countries.
The United Kingdom .also asked for arrangements to keep the
price of imported Cheddar cheese on the British market at a level
corresponding to that at which home-produced cheese must be
sold if British dairy farmers w~re to obtain the target price for milk.
Also, in view of the exceptional importance to the Commonwealth
particularly New Zealand, of the British market for this type ofcheese, the United Kingdom furthermore- asked that this outlet
should not be impaired by any arrangements concluded by the
enlarged Community.
b)  For beef and veal, the British Government asked to retain the
deficiency payments system and requested a longer transitional
period. In consideration of Commonwealth interests, it also asked
that the provisions of the regulation which deals with import
certificates be amended so that chilled and frozen beef would be
treated alike.
c)  For rice, the United Kingdom suggested certain adjustments
to the Commission s proposals to allow for certain specific needs
of the British market.
2. As well as commenting on the proposals already submitted to
the Council, the British Government presented certain observations
on the future common agricultural policy for sugar. It considered
that one aspect of the policy should be restricting the area under
beet, and also asked for measures to prevent imports disorganizing
a Member State s market during the transitional period. The
problem of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and British
commitments under it was dealt with in another connection.
3. The Conference forwarded to the Council the British cotnments
on the regulations still to be adopted.
a)  On the question of subsequent procedure, the Six said that the
United Kingdom Delegation s comments could still be examined
during the negotiations if the regulations in question were adopted
before these ended.
If a regulation were adopted between the signing and the ratifica-
tion of the accession agreement, it could be studied by an interim
committee; this method would provide Gteat Britain with a
guarantee that no important decision would be taken without its
knowledge.
Discussion of this procedure was still going on between the Six
when the negotiations were suspended.b)  The fact remains that agreement between the Six on the regula-
tions covering these products would have made it possible to reach
agreement on the substance of these matters during the negotia-
. tions, and that from this angle speedier Council decisions would
have been welcome. This would not have prevented the Council
from: taking account, before reaching a decision, of the British'
comments, which' at times reflected certain problems already
encountered by the Six.CHAP TER IV
Financial regulation
1. Regulation No. 25 on the financing of the common agricul-
tural policy is an integral part of the Council decisions of 14 January
1962. It provides not only for the establishment of an Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund whose aims and financial
resources it lays down, but also contains provisions on how the
levies charged on imports of farm products from non-member
countries shall be used. Thus, Article 2 (1) of the regulation, for
instance, runs:
Revenue from levies charged on imports from third countries
shall accrue to the Community and shall be used to cover Com-
munity expenditure, so that the budget resources of the Com-
munity shall consist of this revenue, together with all other reve-
nues allotted in accordance with the rules of the Treaty and the
contributions made by Member States in accordance with Article
200 of the Treaty. The Council shall, in due course, set in motion
the procedure laid down in Article 201 of the Treaty for the imple-
mentation of the above provisions.
As discussions on this regulation proceeded it became clear that
views diverged among the Member States as well as between them
and the United Kingdom Delegation on:
.....
a)  The present state of the procedure laid down in Article 201
(had certain stages of this procedure-the Commission s proposal,
consultation of the European Parliament, Council decision-al-
ready been completed, or had they not?)
b)  The extent of the matters of substance to be settled in due
course in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 2
of the Financial Regulation.
As regards point  .b)  the Delegation of one Member State had
declared on several occasions ,that when the levies were being
transfe~red to the Community, a certain number of other important
questions would have to be settled, in particular:a)  The question of the Community s other revenues expressly
referred to in Article 2 of the regulation, and
b)  The question of a fair allocation of the financial burden.
The Lord J?rivy Seal also stated on 22 February 1962 that the
United Kingdom would have to ask that Community expenditure
including expenditure on agriculture, should be allocated fairly
between the Member States. On 17 May 1962 the Head of the
United Kingdom Delegation at Deputies' level, added to this
statement by giving an interpretation of the Financial Regulation
in a way which threw doubt on the conditions of its application.
Later, the British Government reconsidered these statements and
announced that it could accept the regulation as it stood; the
interpretation of the regulation between the Six themselves had
still not been defined.
In these circumstances it was to be expected that before the levies
were actually transferred to the Community it would be necessary
for the Member States to have "in due course" further discussions
on the substance of these -questions, at which they could examine
not only the procedure for implementing the transfer of the levies
to the Community but also the problems connected with the
Community s other revenues and the fair allocation of the financial
burden. The Delegation of another Community State considered
that, precisely because of Great Britain s request concerning
imports of temperate foodstuffs, the uncertainty arising from the
divergent interpretations of the Financial Regulation could not
be allowed to continue. This Delegation therefore insisted on
immediate and complete implementation of the procedure laid
down in Article 201, so that the decision on levies in Regulation
No. 25 might become "final and irrevocable
2. Up to January 1963 several attempts were made among the
Six to find a strictly procedural answer. ' These proposals were
all more or less variants of the two theoretically possible proce-
dural solutions, i.e. :
a)  Either to make the effective transfer of the levies to the Com-
munity subject to a decision on the related problems, particularlythe fair allocation of the financial burden, such a decision to be
taken at a later date but before the end of the transitional period;
b)  Or to gttarantee forthwith that the levies be transferred to the
Community under a legally binding assurance given on ratification
-of the British treaty of accession, while relying on a subsequent
procedure to solve the related problems.
It was fairly clear that neither of these solutions had any great
-chance of success, i.e. of proving acceptable to all Delegations.
In fact a synthesis of the two points of view was only possible if
the question of substance could itself be settled during the acces-
sion negotiations. In this connection the Commission had exam-
ined the situation and set out a number of conditions which
would have to be met by any proposal if it were to have a chance
of being accepted. These conditions were:
a)  The decision of 14 January 1962 on the transfer of the levies
to the Community after the transitional period must not be called
into question;
.b)  The procedure under Article 201 provided for in Regulation
No. 25 must be completed at the same time as the accession of
the United Kingdom was ratified, thus clearing up any uncertainty
as to the effective transfer of levies to the Community;
c)  The question of those other revenues of the Community express-
ly referred to i~ Article 2 of the regulation would have to be solved
and a fair distribution of the burden secured;
d)  The solution proposed must guarantee the neutrality of the
levy system, i.e. there should be no encouragement to import from
non-member countries rather than from Community countries;
c)  The negotiations on Great Britain's accession should not be
unduly retarded.
3. On the basis of these conditions the Commission worked out
a solution which was transmitted to the six' Member States on
19 December 1962. To facilitate the discussion the Commission
submitted this working paper in the form of articles, at the same
time pointing out that it was in noway a Commission proposal
within the meaning of the Treaty. The next was as follows:Article 
After the expiry of the ,transitional period revenue arising from the
application to imports from non-member countries of the duties.
in the common customs tariff and from agricultural levies shall
accrue to the European Economic Community as revenue of its. own. 
Article 
Tne revenue mentioned in Article 1 shall be used to finance the
budget of the European Economic Coi:nmunity and the European
Development Fund.
Article  ~ 3
....
The Commission shall each year carry out in respect of each
Member State a comparison between the amount of the customs
duties and levies charged On its territory and its share in Com-
munity expenditure borne by such Member States under the terms
of Article 200 (1) of the Treaty.
Those Member States for which the comparison shows that they.
are levying more th~ they are contributing to expenditure shall
pay a financial contribution equal to two-thirds of the difference:
noted.
Those Member States for which the comparison shows that they
are contributing mare than they are levying shall receive from the
Commuility a payment equal to two-thirds of the difference noted.
Article 
1.. If, after completion of the operations laid down in Article 
. above, the Community's revenues are in excess of the expenditure
provided for in Article 2, the surplus shall be distributed among the
Member States in proportion to the share of the Community s own
revenue~ raised in thc;:ir r~spective territories.
2. If, after c~mple~on 'of the operations described in Article 3
above, the expen~ture provided for in Article 2 exceeds the
Community's revenues the deficit shall be covered by financial
contributions from ~e Member States in conformity with Article
200 (1) of the Treao/.Article 
In due course, the Council acting by qualified majority on 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Parlia-
ment, shallla y down the appropriate provisions on the collection
and the management by the Community of the revenue referred
to in Article 1 and raised by the Member States.
Article 
To ensure smooth transition to the financial system of the final
period the Member States shall, with effe~t from the third align-
ment of their tariff with the common customs tariff, pay a certain
annual percentage of their customs revenue to the Community
as a contribution to its budget. 
The percentages and details of such payments shall be fixed by
the Council in accordance with the procedure in Article 200 (3)
of the Treaty at the same time as the Council establishes, by virtue
of Article 7 (2) of Regulation No. 25, the rules concerning the'
revenues of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund.
Article 
Without prejudice to the possibility of action at any time under
Article 201 of the Treaty, the Commission shall submit to the
Council, in due course and at latest by the end of the transitional
period, proposals under the said Article on:
a)  The pace at which the contributions and payments provided
for in Article 3 will gradually be reduced until they end in 1975;
b)  How any surpluses are to be appropriated;
c)  Any other measures which appear opportune in the light of the
development of the Community.
In making these proposals the Commission will take into account
the need to ensure a fair distribution of the financial burdens on the
different Member States.
4. The ensuing discussion between the Six revealed that several
Delegatiotl3 were still not convinced that it was impossible to finda purely procedural answer. Several Delegations entertained grave
doubts as to the justification and also the possibility of fuiding
at this juncture a precisesol~tion to a problem of substance which
would only come up in the future-and even then under conditions
difficult to appraise at the present time.
To this it could be replied that the system which the Commission
had endeavoured to work out was specially conceived to 
applicable irrespective of the subsequent importance of the various
elements to be taken into consideration. In other words, that it
was already possible to adopt certain proportions as a basis irre-
spective of the future amounts involved. The Commission
proposal was also founded on recognition of the fact that no proce-
dural solution could give genuine guarantees to all the parties
concerned, as these at present had copflicting preoccupations and
conflicting aims. The Commission therefore still believes that
the best way to have solved the problem would have been to try
to settle the questions of substance.CHAPTER V
Economic union
1. In his statement of 10 October 1961 Mr. Heath suggested
-studying how far the regulations, directives, decisions and recom-
mendations adopted since the Treaty came into force could be
applied to the United Kingdom as they stood. After quoting as
.examples social security, monopolies and restrictive practices, the
right of establishment, services and capital movements, he pro-
posed that discussions between experts should be begun so that
the British Government might become better acquainted with
Community law in these fields.
Following this proposal, a procedure was established to enable
the United Kingdom Delegation to contact the Commission and
obtain the desired information.
Information was sought on the following subjects: the free move-
ment of goods, commercial policy, transport, economic policy
(including anti-cyclical policy and the articles of the Treaty which
deal with the balance of payments), the right of establishment
services, free movement of capital, rules governing competition
(including the approximation of legislation), equal pay for men
and women, free movement of labour, and social security.
2. At the close of these discussions, the United Kingdom Dele-
gation announced that they could accept the provisions of the
Treaty and the regulations, directives, decisions and recommenda-
tions in force, subject to the following reservations:
a)  A more detailed study of the rules of competition applicable to
agriculture;
b)  The special situation of Northern Ireland as regards the free
movement of labour;
c)  The time-table for establishing equal pay for men and women
in the United Kingdom.3. The United Kingdom Delegation also expressed the wish
that a working party should study certain administrative difficul-
ties which might arise because of the special features of the British
social security system.
These difficulties related to the problem of repayment of medical
costs (waiving of rights to reimbursement, lump-sum refunds and
individual refunds upon presentation of bills), the fixing of the
lump sum per unit, calculation of the number of units involved
the problem of tourists (the United Kingdom has no entry check
which would make  it  possible to single out those tourists who are
employed persol1s), procedures for settlements between institutions
(by payment or by waiver), entitlement documents and the prep-
aration of accounts for mutual settlement of medical costs between
the institutions of different countries.
All the delegations expressed satisfaction at the Working Party
discussions. Indeed, talks are now going on among the Six
independently of the negotiations with the United Kingdom, with
the aim of simplifying wherever possible the procedures ul1der
Regulatiol1s No. 3 and No. , which deal with social security for
migrant workers. Thal1ks to the discussions with the United
Kingdom Delegation, it has been possible to take the situation in
the United Kingdom into account when working on this simpli-
fication. It will be noted that the work concerned administrative
questions only. Althoug? in the six countries sodal charges are
very largely financed by employers' and workers ' contributions
proportionate to earnings, in Great Britain the main burden is
borne by the taxpayer. This difference in financing could have led
to distortions of competition in ,the Common Market. The
problem was raised in connection with the negotiations with
ECSC.
4. In the absence of further details from the United Kingdom
Delegation it is difficult to estimate the scope of its reservations
concerning Northern Ireland, equal pay for men and. women
and the application of the rules of competition to agriculture.
Subject to correction, the Commission does not, however, thinkthat these reservations 'Would have given rise to very serIOUS
difficulties.
5. It may be considered surprising that the Conference paid
relatively little attention to the problems of the economic union
at least in their general aspects. This is mainly due to the fact
that the United Ktngdom Delegation was intent above all on' defin-
ing the points on which it had to ask for a modification or an excep-
tion to the Community law in force. In the field of economic
union, however, most of the common policies have still to 
established. Great Britain could therefore confine its reservations
to the questions mentioned above.
On the Community side, it was difficult to go any further as the
Six had not reached full agreement on the future development of
the various common policies (transport, tax harmocization
approximation of laws, fiscal policy, monetary policy, economic
policy, regional policy, commercial policy, etc.). At the very
beginning of the negotiations, however ' the spokesman for the
Six and the President of the Commission ha,d stressed the impor-
tance which the Community attached to the Treaty provisions
on economic ucion, since this union is one of the conditions for
the success of the custO!IlS union itself. In his rep~y, Mr. Heath
acknowledged the importance of the articles of the Treaty dealing
with economic union, and the importance of harmonizi:ng national
policies as foreshadowed in these articles.CHAPTER VI
EFT A and the  other European  countries
concerned in the negotiations
1. The problem of relations with EFT A had been mentioned by
the British Prime Minister in his statement to the House of Com-
mons on 31 July 1961 as one of the major problems which would
decide the outcome of the negotiations which the British Govern-
ment proposed to open with a view to membership of the European.
Economic Community. In his speech to the Commons on
2 August 1961 Mr. Macmillan, introducing the motion referred to
at the beginning of this report, again stressed that an arrangement
which would satisfy the special interests of the EFT A countrie&
was one condition for the accession of Britain itself. This position
was reiterated and amplified in the statement made by the Lord
Privy Seal in Paris on 10 October 1961, which on this point as on
others formed the practical basis of the negotiations. At this
meeting Mr. Heath drew attention to the Stockholm Convention
and the subsequent commitments entered into by Great Britain
in particular at the EFT  Council meeting in June and July
1961 (1). These decisions left each member of EFT A free to'
establish direct relations with the Community, while at the same:
time keeping EFTA in forc~ "until satisfactory arrangements have
been worked out... to meet the various legitimate interests of all
members of EFTA, and thus enable them all to participate from
the same date in an integrated European market. Mr. Heath
added: "If satisfactory arrangements could be m~de on these line&
the wider trading area thus created would include, not only the
members of . the enlarged Community, but also the remaining
members of EFTA, and, of course, Greece.
In addition to the members of EFT A .other than Great Britain
(Denmark~ Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal) the
Lord Privy Seal mentioned the cases of two other countries for
(1) Paras. 58, 59 and 60 of the statement of 10 October 1961.which arrangements would have to be made: Finland and Ire-
land (1). As regards Finland, an associate of EFT A, Mr. Heath
pointed to the need to maintain that country s commercial links
with Western Europe. In the case of the Irish Republic, with
which Great Britain has special trading arrangements, Mr. Heath
recalled Ireland's application to become a member of the Com-
munity, and said that if the application succeeded, these special
arrangements would be subsumed in the wider arrangements of
the enlarged Community.
2. It so happened that the problems mentioned by Mr. Heath in
connection with EFT A were not dealt with in the. first phases of
the negotiations, since there seems to have been fairly general
agreement to take first the most important of the strictly British
problems (Commonwealth and agriculture). Apart from consid-
erations of a practical nature, this postponement of the exami-
nation of certain problems could be justified by the fact that the
EFT A applications appeared to be consequences of the British
application itself, or at any rate closely bound up with the success
of the latter. Nevertheless, the procedure with the various EFT A
countries was set in motion concurrently with the United Kingdom
negotiations.
In conformity with the aforementioned decision of the EFTA
Council, the signatories of the Stockholm Convention approached
the Community in turn, stating in broad outline their position in
relation both to the political aspects of the Treaty of Rome and to
its economic or commercial provisions.
i)  On 10 August 1961 Denmark announced that it wished to nego-
tiate with the European Economic Community with a view 
accession under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.
On 27 September 1961 the EEC Council of Ministers accepted this
application.
A first hearing of the Danish Delegation at ministerial level took
place on 26 October 1961. This was followed by six meetings
(1) Ibid., paras. 61 and 62.at ministerial level and five meetings of officials, with various
contacts at other levels.
Ii)  Norway announced on 2 May 1962 that it wished to op~n
llegotiatiqns for membership of the Community under Article 237
of the Treaty of Rome. A first hearing took place on 4 July 1962
:at ministerial level; the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs
ieferred to the problems which might arise for Norway in the
event of accession. At this meeting the BEC Council of Ministers
:acceded to the Norwegian Government's request for the opening
of negotiations. This was followed by a meeting at ministerial
level in Brussels on 12 November 1962.
In addition, the Republic of Ireland also declared, in a letter of
31 July 1961, that it wished to enter into negotiations with the
Community with a view to accession under Article 237 of the
Treaty of Rome.
On 18 January 1962 a first meeting was held with therepresenta-
rives of the Irish Government; at this meeting Mr. Lemass, Prime
Minister of Ireland, referred to the problems which accession might
pose for his country. A meeting with Irish officials was held in
Brussels on 11 May 1962. 
On 23 October 1962 the EEC Council of Ministers accepted the
Irish application for negotiations with a view to accession.
iii)  On 12 December 1961 Austria announced its desire to open
negotiations with the Community with a view to a purely economic
:agreement under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.
On 28 May 1962 the EEC Council of Ministers accepted this
iequest.
A first hearing of the Austrian Delegation at ministerial level took
, place on 28 July 1962.
ivY  On 12 December 1961 Sweden ann~unced that it wished to
open negotiations with the Community for an economic associa-
tion under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.
On  28 May 1962 the BEC Council of Ministers accepted this
request.A first hearing of the Swedish Delegation at ministerial level took
place on 28 July 1962.
v)  On 15 December 1961 Switzerland announced that it wished
to open negotiations with the Community with a view to seeking
an appropriate form of participation in the Common Market
under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.
On 28 Ma y 1962 the EEC Council of Ministers accepted this
request.
A first hearinK of the Swiss Delegation took place in Brussels on
24 September 1962.
vi)  On 18 May 1962 Portugal announced that it wished to open
negotiations with the Community with a view to establishing the
terms for future collaboration with the Community under Ar-
ticle 238 of the Treaty of. Rome.
On 19 December 1962 the EEC Council of Ministers accepted this request. 
A first hearing of the Portuguese Delegation was fixed for 11 Feb-
ruary 1963 in Brussels.
vii)  On 29 January 1963 Finland had not yet announced its posi-
tion.
In the case of Denmark, the conversations were thus well under
way by 29 January 1963.
With Norway and Ireland on the other hand the negotiations
proper had not yet got under way, but contacts had been made and
the importance of certain special problems had been assessed.
As regards the three neutral countries, the negotiations had not
advanced beyond an initial statement of position by the countries
concerned. For Portugal, a date had been fixed for a first hearing
but this had not taken place. As has been stated, Finland had not
yet made its position known.
3. There were two facets to the EFT A problem: first, the estab-
lishment of long-term relations under Articles 237 or, 238 betweenStockholm Convention countries and the Community, which was
the' object of the approaches referred to above, and secondly the
consequences for Great Britain itself of its membership of EFT A
, in other words, the repercussions on the negotiations with
Great Britain of that country s preferential tariff relationships with
its partners under the Stockholm Convention.
In fact, it was from this latter angle that the problem was first
posed, in connection with the interpretation of a general provision
of the Treaty of Rome~Article 234-and with the application by
the United Kingdom of the common customs tariff.
In May 1962, during the negotiations with Great Britain, the
spokesman of the Six found it necessary to recall c~rtain points
alrea~y made in the preliminary replies from the representatives of
the Community to Mr. Heath's statement of 10 October. In these
it was made clear that the common customs tariff had to be imple-
mented by the United Kingdom in its trade with all non-member
countries. The Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation
answered at the time that th€ Treaty of Rome included provisions
relating to conventions concluded prior to the entry into force of
the Treaty. The allusion was to Article 234, but Mr. Heath did
not explain the exact meaning of his remark nor to which special
cases he thought it applicable.
It seemed that this uncertainty needed to be cleared up. Mter
going into the question at some length, the Six informed the
United Kingdom Delegation that they did not consider that
Article 234 of the Treaty, which was couched in very general terms
and essentially concerned non- ~eferential commitments such as
those under GA TT, could be invoked to postpone to a date after
British accession the settlement of such an important problem as
that of Great Britain's preferential relations with EFTA. Such a
solution would. moreover involve considerable disadvantages both
from the legal and technical points of view. It was therefore in
the actual negotiations for Great Britain's accession that solutions
would have to. be found for the future of the British preferential
tariff applicable to EFTA. At a ministerial meeting in Decem-ber 1962, the Leader of the British Delegation fully accepted this
argument and confirmed that Great Britain did not intend to
invoke Article 234 in order to settle the problem of its relations
with EFT A; this meant that the common tariff would be applied
to all non-member countries; save in so far as special arrangements
might be negotiated before Britain s accession.
4. Nevertheless, the EFT A problem could not thereby be con-
sidered as settled.
, on the one hand, Great Britain did not intend' to withdraw
from EFTA (Article 42 of the Stockholm Convention, which pro-
vides for withdrawal, fixes one year s notice) and if, on the other
hand, Great Britain was not concerned at the present stage about
the future of its preferential tariff for trade with its EFT A partners
this was because it still assumed an overall solution which would
meet the various legitimate interests of all members of EFT A
and thus enable them all to participate from the same date in an 
integrated European market Obviously on this assumption~
and the British position was reaffirmed during the ministerial
meetings of December 1962-the points raised by the Six were
irrelevant.
But we must consider the consequences of. such a position as
regards the British negotiations themselves:
a)  As regards the timing, Britain' s accession was put off to a more
uncertain date, which depended on the course of the other nego-
tiations for accession or association;
b)  As regards the substance of the matter, Britain's accession
itself became contingent upon the success of these other nego-
tiations.
5. With regard to the three candidates for membership it was
doubtless still too soon to prejudge the soltttions on points of
substance which would be adopted, in view of the problems. or of
the specific reservations .which had been expressed. But the
negotiations, agreed to in principle, at least had one firm basis:
since it was a question of accession, this basis could only be the 99-100
Treaty of Rome, i.e. a complex of provisions that were known and
had' an internal balance which was already definite.
In any case it could be considered then that, whatever the solution
adopted on the point of substance, it should at least be possible
for the uncertainty to be dispelled fairly soon.
For the other applications from EFTA Member States, on the
other hand, it was much more difficult to establish assumptions on
either the timing or the nature of the solutions to be adopted.
Although the decision to negotiate had been taken, the content
of these negotiations remained much more uncertain than in the
case of the three countries applying for membership. What consti-
tutes association is in fact not defined by the Treaty of Rome
itself, and the scope or the balance of an agreement on association
can therefore be conceived in very different ways. The uncertainty
on these points had already been mentioned on the Community
side in the preliminary replies to Mr. Heath' s statement of 10 Oc- tober. 
Furthermore, participation by all these countries in an integrated
common market as proposed in EFT A's London communique
immediately posed delicate questions of economic harmonization
and integration, as each country had its own problems or reser-
vations. From the Community point of view, it has always been
maintained that the customs union was not to be thought of as 
arrangement in isolation; it only made sense and had practical
prospects of success if it were embedded in .an economic union.
The formula of association, since it meant long-term participation
in an integrated European market, could also raise an institutional
problem which called for thorough examination to ensure a
balance of commitments among the parties concerned and to give
the wider common market a chance of functioning. The case of
Finland, which on association with EFT A had concluded with the
USSR an agreement on non-discrimination in tariffs, might well
add a delicate legal problem. In a more general way, the distinc-
tion drawn by certain States between the economic or commercialaspects of the Treaty of Rome and its political implications, a
distinction which had prompted them to proceed by way of
Article 238, required of the Community an answer on the question
of principle, which itself could not be divorced from one particular
concept of association (1). Finally, the extension of the common
market to these various countries could not fail to raise, before
long, the question of' trade relations with the  other European
countrbs still outside both EEC and EFTA, in particular Spain (2
6. One solution suggested by tbe Six was to work out a pro-
visional system which, without prejudging solutions on matters
of substance, would have made it possible to conclude the talks
which had reached the most advanced stage, in particular with
those countries applying for membership.
Such a system could broadly have made use o,f the possibilities
offered by the forthcoming tariff negotiations proposed by Presi-
dent Kennedy. The arrangements for dealing with the special
position enjoyed by the countries in question on the markets of the
United Kingdom or of the other States seeking membership, in
other words the arrangements governing the gradual application
of the common tariff, could have beeq modelled on the transitional
arrangements already adopted in the negotiations with the United
IZingdom.
7. Another problem of rather different character arose regarding
the relations of Greece with Great Britain. Under Article 64 (3)
of the Association 4greement consultations on tbe negotiations
with the United Kingdom were to take place with the Greek
Delegation. The same article provided that accession of a new
member would confer no rights and impose no obligations on
Greece until a protocol had been concluded with the Greek Go-
vernment.
(1) It should be remembered that unlike Article 237 (membership), Article 238 (association)
is not limited to European countries.
(2) Application from Spain dated 6 February 1962 for association with the Community with
a view to complete integration at a later date. 101102
Arrangements had been made for these consultations to take place
as the negotiations with the United Kingdom progressed, but the
substance of the protocol on the rights and obligations arising
between the new member and Greece had not yet been discussed.
This question would have had to be settled by the date of Great
Britain' s accession, as Greece isa member of the customs union
of the Common Market.CHAPTER VII
Legal, financial and institutional questions
A.  LEGAL QUESTIONS
Certain legal problems were to be settled during the negotiations;
these were of two orders:
1. The adjustment needed in the Treaty and in the acts of the
Community by reason of the United Kingdoms s accession;
2. The rules needed to ensure the entry into force, in respect of
the United Kingdom, of Community law adapted in this way.
Of the adjustments required, only the modification of the financial
and institutional provisions of the Treaty is of any real political
interest. This is discussed below. 1;'he other adjustments to the
Treaty and to the acts of the CO1Il1Ilunity were largely a question
of adding references to the new Member State in certain texts, or
of setting or modifying certain dates or time-limits. These were
mostly matters of form presenting no difficulty, and up to the
time when the negotiations were suspended they had not been discussed. 
Making CO1Il1Ilunity law applicable to the United Kingdom would
have required certain rules and procedures which would have
been embodied in the texts to be adopted by the Conference.
Under the second paragraph of Article 237, the conditions of
admission and the adjustments to the Treaty were to be agreed
between the Member States and the United Kingdom, such agree-
ment to be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
The effect of such ratification would have been that Community law
would have become enforceable in the United Kingdom under the
conditions laid down by the Treaty. The United Kingdom
Delegation raised no objections to this principle. However, it
might have been thought advisable to ensure, in subsequent con- 103104
versations, that the measures contemplated for this purpose by the
British Government really would give Community law the same
force in the United Kingdom as in the Member States.
The Conference did not re~ch the point of considering what would
be the most suitable form for the agreement and the appropriate
procedure for its ratification. At the sixteenth Ministerial Meeting
it had, however, taken up this question and had instructed a
Working Party of Secretariat and Commission officials, convened
at the in~tance of the Chairm~n, to examine together with officials
of the United Kingdom Delegation the form to be given to the
various arrangements concluded or to be concluded by the Con-
ference. A paper on this subject was presented by the Chairman
to the Conference at its seventeenth ministerial meeting on 28 J an-
uary 1963. This paper proposed that before any texts were
drafted a general plan should be adopted concerning the form each
would take (convention or agreement, protocols, declarations).
Certain measures preparatory to the entry into force of Co~unity
law in the United Kingdom would also have been necessary.
Further to an agreement reached at the Conference, the Commis-
sion and the United Kingdom Delegation had already begun work
on an English version of the Treaty for submission to the Con-
ference. The Conference had not yet considered the question of
the translation and emendation of the acts of the Community.
Nor had it examined the question whether a special procedure
should be.laid down for the new Member State to have some say
in the drafting of Community acts in the interval between signature
of the agreement and actual accession.
The Conference had not discussed the legaJ!procedures which
would be required so that the United Kingdom s accession to
Euratom and ECSC could be timed to coincide with its accession
to the Economic Community. Nothing had been done with
regard to the legal procedures that would be needed if other States
in particular the members of EFT A, were to join or associate them-
selves with the Community at the same time as the United King-dom; here, however, the legal problems would have been no
different in nature from those mentioned above.
B.  FINANCIAL QUESTIONS
The accession of a new member to the Community obviously
raises the question of its contribution to the Community s budget
and therefore of a new apportionment of th~ financial burden
between all the Member States. This is the kind of adjustment
to which the Treaty of Rome itself refers in Article 237.
1. The problem is here considered only in ~ts bearing on the
negotiations with the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom Delegation had given some general indi-
cation on this subject, suggesting that it should contribute the
same amount as France, Germany and Italy to the Community
budget (Article 200 (1) of the Treaty), and the same amount as
France and Germany to the Social Fund (Article 200 (2)). These
suggestions were favourably received.
The question of the British contribution to the European Invest-
ment Bank had not been raised, though it could probably have
been settled on similar lines without any great difficulty. On the
other hand the question of the British contribution to the Overseas
Development Fund had as stated earlier been left open; and here
some rather delicate problems of balance would have had to be
solved. It should also be recalled that the financial regulation
adopted  on  14 January 1962 in connection with the common
agricultural policy was another important question still out-
standing.
2. The various questions concerning British contributions were
to have been re-examined in the light of the 0utcome of the other
negotiations in hand, so that the whole question of apportioning
the financial burden could be finally settled in the light of any other
decisions on the accession or association of other European
countries. 105106
C. INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
This was another field in which an enlargement of the Community
would of necessity involve adjustments to the Treaty of Rome.
1. As in the case of financial contributions, the problem can be
considered first of all solely with reference to the negotiations with
the United Kingd?m.
The United Kingdom had made various suggestions on this
subject which had met with fairly general assent on the part 
the Six. The main questions were the weighting of the United
Kingdom vote, which was to have been the same as that applying
to other member countries of comparable size, and the mainte-
nance of the arrangement established in Article 148 of the Treaty
of Rome whereby a qualified majority consists of two thirds of the
votes. The question of British participation in the various Com-
munity institutions had also been raised, and there was no reason
to believe that Treaty rules or current practices would have raised
difficulties in this matter.
Certain points of procedure had yet to be settled, in particular
with regard to the second case referred to in Article 148 (2) and
the application of the simple majority rule laid down in Article
148 (1).
2. The problem, however, could not be dealt with entirely on
the assumption that only the United Kingdom would be joining.
The possibility of the accession of other States, which might
for example, have increased the Community membership to ten
called for a re-consideration of the problem as a whole. This
was necessary firstly in order to harmonize the .various solutions
so that the final general arrangement should be balanced and
coherent, and secondly because certain special problems connected
with the working of the Community and' the composition of its
institutions then took on a somewhat different aspect (weightings
for all the Member States, definition of qualified majority for
decisions on a proposal of the Commission, definition of qualified
majority for other decisions, simple majority, unaiUmity, composi-tion of the EEC and Euratom Commissions and of the ECSC
High Authority).
No delicate problems were expected to arise in connection with
the Court of Justice, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and various advisory. bodies of the Community.
These points had been raised in preliminary conversations within
the Community but had not yet come up in the negotiations proper;
they were being held over until the complex of negotiations with
the various countries concerned had reached a sufficiently advanced
. stage.
107III.  FINAL OBSERVATIONS
One feature of the negotiations with the United Kingdom which
sta~ds out when an endeavour is made to draw up an impartial
review of their results is their remarkable complexity.
The number of problems raised, the novelty of some of them
(Commonwealth, British agriculture EFT A) .and the need to
reconcile tw-o sets of commitments as v~st as those of the United
Kingdom and those of the Treaty of Rome obviously posed extre-
mely delicate problems for both the United- Kingdom and the
Community. It is of no small significance that the negotiations
in fact bore mainly on the most precise stipulations of the' Treaty
or those establishing automatic commitments, namely the customs
union in its various aspects, and the first tangible manifestations
of a common policy in the sphere in which the Community had
so far taken definite measures, i.e. agriculture, together with its
repercuss10ns.
It may therefore not be inappropriate to conclude this report
with an attempt at certain more general assessments. '
The method adopted in the negotiations was to deal one after
the other with the points which had been raised by the United
Kingdom Delegation. Where this method has been used in this
report, it may at times have obscured the relative significance of
the problems raised, the particular aspect some of these problems
had assumed by the time the negotiations were suspended, and
the links or inter-relationships that often existed between them.
Moreover, all the agreements reached were approved subject to
the reservation that they were provisional and would, of course
have to be confirmed in the final general agreement.
1. A usefull starting point would be to establish the relative
importance of the problems considered. The negotiations tended
to place on the same level questions of widely varying impact. 109110
review of the negotiations' should offer a more discerning
appraisal.
Many points left in abeyance may be classified as of minor conse-
quence. In the tariff field in particular, the tactical manoeuvring
inseparable from negotiations had certainly delayed in many cases
the settlement of secondary problems for which there was no
reason to believe that a solution could not be found. Broadly
speaking it may be said that the normal provisions of the Treaty
and the decision-making powers of Community institutions could
certainly have been accepted as providing the means of reaching
a reasonable solution of many points referred to. in this report
which stem from minor or quite special economic problems.
On the other hand, it is important not to mini~e certain ques-
tions which were still unanswered (apart from the problem of
relations with the EFT A countries, the terms of which were rather
special). With regard to temperate foodstuffs from the Common-
wealth, although a solution had been put forward for cereals, its
extension to certain other products might still have raised diffi-
culties, even though the broad lines were already laid down.
Again, even though some measure of agreement had been reached
as to the final stage regarding British agriculture, it would be a
mistake to p.nderestimate the importance for the Community of
effective transitional arrangements ensuring the progressive inte-
gration of the economies of the Member States and the final
establishment of a single market.
The Six themselves were still not agreed on the interpretation of
the financial regulation, which can be looked upon as a very impor-
tant element in the system for agriculture.
2. In this context, it is not uninteresting to note that :what was
needed for a solution was in some cases mainly a move from the
British Government, but that there were also cases in which the
issue turned upon proposals to be drawn up by the Six themselves.
To take the example of zero duties, the United Kingdom Dele-
gation had during the last meetings put forward a compromiseproposal for one important product. But the negotiations had
never officially touched on certain other products, which were
among the most import~nt, because the Six had not yet been able
to reach a common standpoint on them which could accommodate
the diverging interests of the Member States or take into account
the differing ,importance they attributed to given cases. Here
was a problem of considerable economic interest.
Although there was still a chance that British proposals for
agriculture would be forthcoming which would have due regard
for the criticisms or misgivings expressed by the Six, an overall
view was still lacking because the Community had reached no
decision on certain important products (dairy produce, beef
sugar and rice).
Similarly, with regard to the financial regulation, the negotiations
with Great Britain and particu~rly the views expressed at the
outset on the British side had re-opened among the Six themselves
difficulties of interpretation which they had not yet succeeded 
overcoming when the negotiations were suspended.
3. This brings us to reflect in more general terms upon the real
difficulties in the negotiations. The question was not only one
of reconciling British systems and commitments with the letter 
the Treaty of Rome: ,it was rather one of reconciling them with
a Community in the full surge of development. The British
application for membership involved an obligation to accept not
only the Treaty but the substantial advances made since the Treaty
was signed. It was on these advances that discussion was some-
times most difficult. But the fact that in certain fields the content
of the Treaty was still in a preliminary stage, and that, broadly
speaking, the implementation of its various aspects was in an
intermediary phase, may also be considered as having made
matters more difficult for the negotiators. The problem was one
of reconciling with Community arrangements the action taken to
adjust the British system whilst paying due heed both to Great
Britain s vital interests and to a Community system which itself
lay largely in the future. 111112
The Cqmmission endeavoured throughout to work for a solution
of Great Britain's specific problems by taking a long view and
making use of the time factor. 111- many cases the right solutions
could only be solutions which anticipated the future progress of the
Community, for example in procedural matters, and which had
at the same time the effect of leading the enlarged Community,
probably sooner ' than originally intended, to start working out
common policies.
The negotiations with the United Kingdom, because they brought
these problems to the fore .and in some cases considerably in-
creased their scale, compelled the Community, then, to come to
grips with them sooner than it otherwise would have done. This
process brought with it greater awareness of the responsibilities an
enlarged Community would bear in the world. Because of the
United Kingdom s almost world-wide responsibilities, the ques-
tions raised by the United Kingdom Delegation also made it
vital for the Community to define without delay the main policy
lines of such a large and powerfull Common Market with regard
to matters which, once Britain was a member, would have had
a direct and crucial impact on the overall balance of the free world.